fix: stability batch — hook stdin truncation, Codex exa TOML, Stop hook JSON, GateGuard repetition (#2227)

* fix(hooks): fail open on oversized stdin instead of echoing truncated JSON (#2222)

run-with-flags.js capped stdin at 1MB but every fallthrough path still
echoed the truncated string to stdout. The harness parses hook stdout as
JSON, got a document cut mid-stream, and blocked the tool call — so any
Edit/Write with a >1MB hook payload was permanently blocked by every
registered pre-write hook, before ECC_HOOK_PROFILE / ECC_DISABLED_HOOKS
gating could run.

- Exit 0 with empty stdout (no opinion) when the stdin cap trips, before
  any echo or gating logic.
- Flush stdout via write callback before process.exit: exiting right
  after stdout.write() dropped everything past the ~64KB pipe buffer,
  cutting even sub-cap pass-through payloads mid-JSON.

Regression tests cover the enabled, disabled, and missing-arg paths for
oversized payloads plus full echo of sub-cap >64KB payloads.

* fix(codex): stop emitting invalid exa url entry, align merge with connector policy (#2224)

The Codex MCP merge declared exa with a url key, but Codex's
[mcp_servers.*] TOML schema is stdio-only — the url key makes the
entire config.toml fail to load, bricking both the codex CLI and the
desktop app. Every install/update re-injected the line because the
urlEntry branch treated the broken entry as present.

- ECC_SERVERS now emits only the current default set per
  docs/MCP-CONNECTOR-POLICY.md: chrome-devtools (stdio, command/args).
  Retired servers (supabase, playwright, context7, exa, github, memory,
  sequential-thinking) are never re-emitted; existing user-managed
  entries are untouched.
- The merge now repairs the exact ECC-emitted broken form (url-only
  exa entry) on every run so re-running the installer fixes broken
  configs instead of preserving them. User stdio exa entries
  (command + mcp-remote) are left alone.
- check-codex-global-state.sh requires chrome-devtools instead of the
  retired set, and flags url-only exa entries with a repair hint.

Tests cover repair, re-run idempotence, stdio-entry preservation, and
no-retired-server emission in add, update, dry-run, and disabled modes.

* fix(hooks): never echo truncated stdin from Stop hooks (#2090)

Stop hooks follow the ECC pass-through convention (echo stdin on
stdout), but every echoing Stop hook capped stdin and echoed the capped
string. The Stop payload carries last_assistant_message, so a long
final assistant message produced a JSON document cut mid-stream on
stdout, which the harness reports as 'Stop hook error: JSON validation
failed' across the whole Stop chain.

Reproduced: a Stop payload with a >64KB last_assistant_message run
through run-with-flags + cost-tracker emitted exactly 65536 bytes of
invalid JSON (cost-tracker capped stdin at 64KB — far below realistic
Stop payloads).

- cost-tracker: raise the cap to 1MB (matching all other hooks) and
  suppress the pass-through echo when stdin was truncated.
- check-console-log, stop-format-typecheck, desktop-notify: suppress
  the echo when stdin was truncated; flush stdout before process.exit
  so sub-cap payloads are not cut at the ~64KB pipe buffer.
- All hooks keep exiting 0 (fail-open); diagnostics go to stderr.

New stop-hooks-stdout test asserts the contract for every registered
Stop hook: stdout is empty or valid JSON, exit code 0 — for realistic
100KB payloads and oversized >1MB payloads, via the production runner
and via direct invocation. Updated the old hooks.test.js case that
codified the truncated-echo behavior.

* fix(hooks): dampen GateGuard fact-force repetition in long sessions (#2142)

In long autonomous sessions the fact-force gate produced 10+
near-identical 'state facts -> blocked -> restate -> retry' blocks in
one context window, which measurably raises the odds of the model
collapsing into a degenerate single-token repetition loop.

- Track a per-session fact_force_denials counter in GateGuard state
  (merged max across concurrent writers, reset with the session, robust
  to malformed on-disk values).
- The first GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_FULL_DENIALS denials (default 3) keep
  the full four-fact block; later denials emit a condensed single-line
  message that carries the denial ordinal, so consecutive denials are
  structurally different and never textually identical.
- True retries of the same target remain allowed without re-prompting
  (unchanged). Destructive-Bash and routine-Bash gates are unchanged,
  as are the ECC_GATEGUARD=off / ECC_DISABLED_HOOKS escape hatches.

Eight new tests cover budget counting, condensed format, ordinal
advancement, retry pass-through, env tuning, malformed state, MultiEdit
dampening, and destructive-gate exemption.

* fix(hooks): keep security hooks able to block on oversized stdin (#2222)

Refine the truncation fail-open: instead of skipping the hook entirely,
the runner now suppresses only its own raw-echo when stdin was
truncated. The hook still executes and receives the truncated flag
(run() context / ECC_HOOK_INPUT_TRUNCATED), so config-protection keeps
blocking truncated protected-config payloads (its test requires exit 2)
while pass-through hooks fail open with empty stdout as before.

* style: apply repo formatter to touched hook files
This commit is contained in:
Affaan Mustafa
2026-06-11 00:31:33 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 3bdb4a5e12
commit 6319c7d309
14 changed files with 846 additions and 151 deletions

View File

@@ -28,20 +28,40 @@ const EXCLUDED_PATTERNS = [
const MAX_STDIN = 1024 * 1024; // 1MB limit
let data = '';
let truncated = false;
process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
process.stdin.on('data', chunk => {
if (data.length < MAX_STDIN) {
const remaining = MAX_STDIN - data.length;
data += chunk.substring(0, remaining);
if (chunk.length > remaining) truncated = true;
} else {
truncated = true;
}
});
/**
* Echo stdin back (ECC pass-through convention), then exit once the pipe has
* flushed. Truncated stdin is never echoed: a JSON document cut mid-stream is
* reported by the harness as a Stop hook JSON validation failure (#2090).
*/
function passThroughAndExit() {
if (truncated) {
log('[Hook] check-console-log: stdin exceeded 1MB; suppressing pass-through (fail-open)');
process.exit(0);
}
if (!data) {
process.exit(0);
}
process.stdout.write(data, () => process.exit(0));
}
process.stdin.on('end', () => {
try {
if (!isGitRepo()) {
process.stdout.write(data);
process.exit(0);
passThroughAndExit();
return;
}
const files = getGitModifiedFiles(['\\.tsx?$', '\\.jsx?$'])
@@ -65,7 +85,6 @@ process.stdin.on('end', () => {
log(`[Hook] check-console-log error: ${err.message}`);
}
// Always output the original data
process.stdout.write(data);
process.exit(0);
// Always output the original data (unless truncated)
passThroughAndExit();
});

View File

@@ -128,12 +128,22 @@ function sumUsageFromTranscript(transcriptPath) {
return { inputTokens, outputTokens, cacheWriteTokens, cacheReadTokens, model };
}
const MAX_STDIN = 64 * 1024;
// 1MB, matching the other Stop hooks. The Stop payload carries
// last_assistant_message, which routinely exceeded the old 64KB cap and
// made this hook echo a JSON document cut mid-stream (#2090).
const MAX_STDIN = 1024 * 1024;
let raw = '';
let truncated = false;
process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
process.stdin.on('data', chunk => {
if (raw.length < MAX_STDIN) raw += chunk.substring(0, MAX_STDIN - raw.length);
if (raw.length < MAX_STDIN) {
const remaining = MAX_STDIN - raw.length;
raw += chunk.substring(0, remaining);
if (chunk.length > remaining) truncated = true;
} else {
truncated = true;
}
});
process.stdin.on('end', () => {
@@ -201,6 +211,11 @@ process.stdin.on('end', () => {
// Non-blocking — never fail the Stop hook.
}
// Pass stdin through (required by ECC hook convention).
// Pass stdin through (ECC hook convention) — but never echo truncated
// stdin: invalid JSON on stdout is reported as a Stop hook failure (#2090).
if (truncated) {
process.stderr.write('[Hook] cost-tracker: stdin exceeded 1MB; suppressing pass-through (fail-open)\n');
return;
}
process.stdout.write(raw);
});

View File

@@ -236,15 +236,26 @@ module.exports = { run };
if (require.main === module) {
const MAX_STDIN = 1024 * 1024;
let data = '';
let truncated = false;
process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
process.stdin.on('data', chunk => {
if (data.length < MAX_STDIN) {
data += chunk.substring(0, MAX_STDIN - data.length);
const remaining = MAX_STDIN - data.length;
data += chunk.substring(0, remaining);
if (chunk.length > remaining) truncated = true;
} else {
truncated = true;
}
});
process.stdin.on('end', () => {
const output = run(data);
// Never echo truncated stdin — invalid JSON on stdout is reported as a
// Stop hook failure (#2090).
if (truncated) {
log('[DesktopNotify] stdin exceeded 1MB; suppressing pass-through (fail-open)');
return;
}
if (output) process.stdout.write(output);
});
}

View File

@@ -592,6 +592,7 @@ function saveState(state) {
let mergedChecked = Array.isArray(state.checked) ? state.checked : [];
let mergedLastActive = typeof state.last_active === 'number' ? state.last_active : 0;
let mergedDenials = getDenialCount(state);
try {
if (fs.existsSync(stateFile)) {
@@ -602,6 +603,7 @@ function saveState(state) {
if (typeof diskState.last_active === 'number') {
mergedLastActive = Math.max(mergedLastActive, diskState.last_active);
}
mergedDenials = Math.max(mergedDenials, getDenialCount(diskState));
}
} catch (_) {
/* ignore malformed or transient disk state */
@@ -609,7 +611,8 @@ function saveState(state) {
const finalState = {
checked: pruneCheckedEntries(mergedChecked),
last_active: Math.max(mergedLastActive, Date.now())
last_active: Math.max(mergedLastActive, Date.now()),
fact_force_denials: mergedDenials
};
// Atomic write: temp file + rename prevents partial reads
@@ -652,6 +655,48 @@ function markChecked(key) {
return true;
}
// --- Fact-force denial dampening (#2142) ---
//
// In long sessions the near-identical four-fact deny blocks accumulate in
// the context window and measurably raise the odds of the model dropping
// into a degenerate repetition loop. Emit the full four-fact block only for
// the first GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_FULL_DENIALS denials per session (default
// 3); afterwards emit a condensed single-line denial that carries the
// denial ordinal, so consecutive denials are structurally different and
// never textually identical. True retries of an already-gated target are
// unaffected (they were always allowed). Destructive-Bash and routine-Bash
// gates are unchanged.
const DEFAULT_FULL_DENIALS = 3;
function getFullDenialBudget() {
const raw = Number.parseInt(process.env.GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_FULL_DENIALS || '', 10);
if (Number.isInteger(raw) && raw >= 0) {
return raw;
}
return DEFAULT_FULL_DENIALS;
}
function getDenialCount(state) {
const n = Number(state && state.fact_force_denials);
return Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0 ? Math.floor(n) : 0;
}
/**
* Record a first-touch target AND count the fact-force denial in the same
* state write. Returns the new denial ordinal (1-based) plus whether the
* write persisted.
*/
function markCheckedAndCountDenial(key) {
const state = loadState();
if (!state.checked.includes(key)) {
state.checked.push(key);
}
const denials = getDenialCount(state) + 1;
state.fact_force_denials = denials;
return { ok: saveState(state), denials };
}
function isChecked(key) {
const state = loadState();
const found = state.checked.includes(key);
@@ -792,6 +837,20 @@ function writeGateMsg(filePath) {
].join('\n');
}
/**
* Condensed single-line denial used after the full-block budget is spent
* (#2142). Carries the denial ordinal so consecutive denials differ
* textually, and a one-line recovery hint instead of the multi-line block.
*/
function condensedGateMsg(action, filePath, ordinal) {
const safe = sanitizePath(filePath);
return (
`[Fact-Forcing Gate] (denial #${ordinal} this session) First ${action} of ${safe}: ` +
"briefly state importers/callers, affected API, data schemas if any, and the user's verbatim instruction, then retry. " +
'(ECC_GATEGUARD=off disables this gate.)'
);
}
function destructiveBashMsg() {
return [
'[Fact-Forcing Gate]',
@@ -902,9 +961,14 @@ function run(rawInput) {
}
if (!isChecked(filePath)) {
if (!markChecked(filePath)) {
const { ok, denials } = markCheckedAndCountDenial(filePath);
if (!ok) {
return allowWithStateWarning();
}
if (denials > getFullDenialBudget()) {
const action = toolName === 'Edit' ? 'edit' : 'creation';
return denyResult(condensedGateMsg(action, filePath, denials), { includeRecoveryHint: false });
}
return denyResult(toolName === 'Edit' ? editGateMsg(filePath) : writeGateMsg(filePath));
}
@@ -920,9 +984,13 @@ function run(rawInput) {
for (const edit of edits) {
const filePath = edit.file_path || '';
if (filePath && !isClaudeSettingsPath(filePath) && !isChecked(filePath)) {
if (!markChecked(filePath)) {
const { ok, denials } = markCheckedAndCountDenial(filePath);
if (!ok) {
return allowWithStateWarning();
}
if (denials > getFullDenialBudget()) {
return denyResult(condensedGateMsg('edit', filePath, denials), { includeRecoveryHint: false });
}
return denyResult(editGateMsg(filePath));
}
}

View File

@@ -45,40 +45,52 @@ function writeStderr(stderr) {
process.stderr.write(stderr.endsWith('\n') ? stderr : `${stderr}\n`);
}
function emitHookResult(raw, output) {
/**
* Write stdout fully, then exit. `process.exit()` immediately after
* `process.stdout.write()` drops anything beyond the ~64KB pipe buffer,
* which cut large pass-through payloads mid-JSON and made the harness
* treat the hook as failed (#2222). The write callback fires only after
* the chunk is flushed to the pipe.
*/
function exitWithStdout(text, exitCode) {
if (typeof text !== 'string' || text.length === 0) {
process.exit(exitCode);
}
process.stdout.write(text, () => process.exit(exitCode));
}
function resolveHookResult(raw, output) {
if (typeof output === 'string' || Buffer.isBuffer(output)) {
process.stdout.write(String(output));
return 0;
return { stdout: String(output), exitCode: 0 };
}
if (output && typeof output === 'object') {
writeStderr(output.stderr);
const exitCode = Number.isInteger(output.exitCode) ? output.exitCode : 0;
if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(output, 'additionalContext')) {
process.stdout.write(buildPreToolUseAdditionalContext(output.additionalContext));
} else if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(output, 'stdout')) {
process.stdout.write(String(output.stdout ?? ''));
} else if (!Number.isInteger(output.exitCode) || output.exitCode === 0) {
process.stdout.write(raw);
return { stdout: buildPreToolUseAdditionalContext(output.additionalContext), exitCode };
}
return Number.isInteger(output.exitCode) ? output.exitCode : 0;
if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(output, 'stdout')) {
return { stdout: String(output.stdout ?? ''), exitCode };
}
return { stdout: exitCode === 0 ? raw : '', exitCode };
}
process.stdout.write(raw);
return 0;
return { stdout: raw, exitCode: 0 };
}
function writeLegacySpawnOutput(raw, result) {
function resolveLegacySpawnStdout(raw, result) {
const stdout = typeof result.stdout === 'string' ? result.stdout : '';
if (stdout) {
process.stdout.write(stdout);
return;
return stdout;
}
if (Number.isInteger(result.status) && result.status === 0) {
process.stdout.write(raw);
return raw;
}
return '';
}
function getPluginRoot() {
@@ -92,14 +104,25 @@ async function main() {
const [, , hookId, relScriptPath, profilesCsv] = process.argv;
const { raw, truncated } = await readStdinRaw();
// Oversized payloads: never echo the truncated string — a JSON document
// cut mid-stream is treated by the harness as a hook failure, blocking the
// tool call (#2222). Empty stdout + exit 0 means "no opinion", so
// pass-through paths fail open. The hook itself still runs and receives
// the truncated flag (run() context / ECC_HOOK_INPUT_TRUNCATED), so
// security hooks like config-protection can still choose to block.
const sanitizeEcho = text => (truncated && text === raw ? '' : text);
if (truncated) {
process.stderr.write(`[Hook] stdin exceeded ${MAX_STDIN} bytes for ${hookId || 'unknown'}; suppressing pass-through (fail-open unless the hook blocks)\n`);
}
if (!hookId || !relScriptPath) {
process.stdout.write(raw);
process.exit(0);
exitWithStdout(sanitizeEcho(raw), 0);
return;
}
if (!isHookEnabled(hookId, { profiles: profilesCsv })) {
process.stdout.write(raw);
process.exit(0);
exitWithStdout(sanitizeEcho(raw), 0);
return;
}
const pluginRoot = getPluginRoot();
@@ -109,14 +132,14 @@ async function main() {
// Prevent path traversal outside the plugin root
if (!scriptPath.startsWith(resolvedRoot + path.sep)) {
process.stderr.write(`[Hook] Path traversal rejected for ${hookId}: ${scriptPath}\n`);
process.stdout.write(raw);
process.exit(0);
exitWithStdout(sanitizeEcho(raw), 0);
return;
}
if (!fs.existsSync(scriptPath)) {
process.stderr.write(`[Hook] Script not found for ${hookId}: ${scriptPath}\n`);
process.stdout.write(raw);
process.exit(0);
exitWithStdout(sanitizeEcho(raw), 0);
return;
}
// Prefer direct require() when the hook exports a run(rawInput) function.
@@ -147,12 +170,13 @@ async function main() {
truncated,
maxStdin: MAX_STDIN
});
process.exit(emitHookResult(raw, output));
const result = resolveHookResult(raw, output);
exitWithStdout(sanitizeEcho(result.stdout), result.exitCode);
} catch (runErr) {
process.stderr.write(`[Hook] run() error for ${hookId}: ${runErr.message}\n`);
process.stdout.write(raw);
exitWithStdout(sanitizeEcho(raw), 0);
}
process.exit(0);
return;
}
// Legacy path: spawn a child Node process for hooks without run() export
@@ -171,20 +195,17 @@ async function main() {
timeout: 30000
});
writeLegacySpawnOutput(raw, result);
const legacyStdout = sanitizeEcho(resolveLegacySpawnStdout(raw, result));
if (result.stderr) process.stderr.write(result.stderr);
if (result.error || result.signal || result.status === null) {
const failureDetail = result.error
? result.error.message
: result.signal
? `terminated by signal ${result.signal}`
: 'missing exit status';
const failureDetail = result.error ? result.error.message : result.signal ? `terminated by signal ${result.signal}` : 'missing exit status';
writeStderr(`[Hook] legacy hook execution failed for ${hookId}: ${failureDetail}`);
process.exit(1);
exitWithStdout(legacyStdout, 1);
return;
}
process.exit(Number.isInteger(result.status) ? result.status : 0);
exitWithStdout(legacyStdout, Number.isInteger(result.status) ? result.status : 0);
}
main().catch(err => {

View File

@@ -196,13 +196,30 @@ function run(rawInput) {
if (require.main === module) {
let stdinData = '';
let truncated = false;
process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
process.stdin.on('data', chunk => {
if (stdinData.length < MAX_STDIN) stdinData += chunk.substring(0, MAX_STDIN - stdinData.length);
if (stdinData.length < MAX_STDIN) {
const remaining = MAX_STDIN - stdinData.length;
stdinData += chunk.substring(0, remaining);
if (chunk.length > remaining) truncated = true;
} else {
truncated = true;
}
});
process.stdin.on('end', () => {
process.stdout.write(run(stdinData));
process.exit(0);
const output = run(stdinData);
// Never echo truncated stdin (invalid JSON would be reported as a Stop
// hook failure, #2090); flush stdout before exiting so large payloads
// are not cut at the pipe buffer.
if (truncated) {
process.stderr.write('[Hook] stop-format-typecheck: stdin exceeded 1MB; suppressing pass-through (fail-open)\n');
process.exit(0);
}
if (!output) {
process.exit(0);
}
process.stdout.write(output, () => process.exit(0));
});
}