security: add node-ipc IOC coverage (#1924)

This commit is contained in:
Affaan Mustafa
2026-05-15 06:56:57 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 5b9acd1d92
commit ee85e1482e
4 changed files with 149 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -64,17 +64,22 @@ Project documents added in Linear:
| Surface | Evidence |
| --- | --- |
| PR #1921 | Merged supply-chain IOC expansion for Mini Shai-Hulud/TanStack follow-up |
| Node IPC follow-up | Added May 14 `node-ipc` malicious-version, hash, DNS, and runtime IOC coverage |
| Merge commit | `f04702bdac132662c8496e817bcd850c86e2b854` |
| Local IOC tests | `node tests/ci/scan-supply-chain-iocs.test.js` passed 11/11 |
| Local IOC tests | `node tests/ci/scan-supply-chain-iocs.test.js` passed 12/12 |
| Unicode safety | `node scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js` passed |
| IOC scan | `npm run security:ioc-scan` passed |
| Root suite | `npm test` passed 2426/2426, 0 failed |
| Root suite | `npm test` passed 2427/2427, 0 failed |
| Repo sweeps | IOC scanner sweep passed for trunk, AgentShield, ECC Tools, ECC website, JARVIS, and the ECC document mirror |
The May 15 IOC expansion added coverage for OpenSearch/Mistral/Guardrails/
UiPath/Squawk-style campaign variants, `opensearch_init.js`, `vite_setup.mjs`,
dead-drop/session protocol strings, and AI-tooling persistence surfaces without
committing full high-entropy indicators that trip secret scanners.
The May 15 node-ipc follow-up blocks `node-ipc@9.1.6`, `9.2.3`, `10.1.1`,
`10.1.2`, `11.0.0`, `11.1.0`, and `12.0.1`, plus the `node-ipc.cjs` payload
hash, malicious tarball hashes, DNS exfil domains, and runtime markers reported
by Socket.
## Current Publication Blockers

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ credentials:
- Follow-on reporting from StepSecurity, Socket, Aikido, and Wiz describes the
same campaign expanding into packages associated with Mistral AI, UiPath,
OpenSearch, Guardrails AI, Squawk, and other npm/PyPI packages.
- Socket's 2026-05-14 `node-ipc` report describes a separate active npm
compromise affecting `node-ipc` versions `9.1.6`, `9.2.3`, and `12.0.1`,
with historical malicious `node-ipc` versions also blocked by ECC because
they carried destructive or unauthorized file-writing behavior.
- The live IOC set includes persistence through Claude Code
`.claude/settings.json`, VS Code `.vscode/tasks.json`, and OS-level
`gh-token-monitor` LaunchAgent/systemd services. Some variants add a
@@ -35,6 +39,12 @@ credentials:
`opensearch_init.js`, `vite_setup.mjs`, campaign salt `svksjrhjkcejg`,
Session protocol strings, `claude@users.noreply.github.com` dead-drop
commits, `dependabout/` branch names, and `OhNoWhatsGoingOnWithGitHub`.
- The `node-ipc` sweep watches for `node-ipc.cjs` payload hash
`96097e06...d9034144`, tarball hashes for the malicious `9.1.6`, `9.2.3`,
and `12.0.1` artifacts, `sh.azurestaticprovider.net`, `bt.node.js`,
`37.16.75.69`, DNS exfil labels `xh` / `xd` / `xf` where present in
artifacts, `__ntw`, `__ntRun`, `/nt-` temp archives, and archive entries such
as `uname.txt`, `envs.txt`, and `fixtures/_paths.txt`.
- The attack chain combined `pull_request_target`, GitHub Actions cache
poisoning across a fork/base trust boundary, and OIDC token extraction from a
GitHub Actions runner.
@@ -47,6 +57,7 @@ Primary references:
- <https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem>
- <https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx>
- <https://tanstack.com/blog/incident-followup>
- <https://socket.dev/blog/node-ipc-package-compromised>
- <https://docs.npmjs.com/trusted-publishers/>
- <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/09/23/widespread-supply-chain-compromise-impacting-npm-ecosystem>