Finishes the steer/transmit loop — advisories now reach the agents' sessions.
- message-sink.js: createEccMessageSink() delivers via the canonical writer
'ecc-tui messages send' (maps steer/hold -> conflict kind, transmit -> query),
resolving the binary from override/env/built target/PATH. Injectable runner;
best-effort (a missing binary/failed send is counted skipped, never blocks).
- proximity.js: createProximityDispatcher() adds per-trigger cooldown so a
persistent collision fires once then stays quiet (agents get steered, not
spammed); runProximityTick() builds the snapshot and dispatches.
- scripts/proximity-tick.js: thin CLI — one-shot, --dry-run, --watch <sec>.
Messages are internal ECC agent-to-agent coordination, not any external channel.
- 14 new tests (sink argv/kind mapping, cooldown dedup, tick dispatch/dry-run,
CLI parse). Full suite 2891/2891; lint green.
- Line precision: parse git diff --unified=0 into per-file changed line ranges
(defaultWorkingSetFor), so two agents in the SAME file but DIFFERENT functions
no longer false-collide. Overlap channel now uses the overlap coefficient
(|A∩B|/min(|A|,|B|)) — high when one edit sits inside the other's region, low
for disjoint ranges; whole-file edit = 1. Docstring + design doc updated.
- Trigger firing: buildProximityTriggers() turns advisories into the concrete
messages — transmit-intent to both on a Traffic Advisory, steer-away to the
yielding agent + a hold notice on a Resolution Advisory. buildProximitySnapshot
now returns triggers; dispatchProximityTriggers(triggers, {sendMessage}) delivers
them through an injectable sink (the ECC messages table), best-effort.
- 12 new tests (line-range disjoint vs overlapping, parseDiffRanges, triggers,
dispatch). Full suite 2881/2881; lint green.
Turns live sessions into the airspace scan: each worktree session's git diff
becomes its working set, the dependency graph is built over the touched files,
and scanAirspace() produces the TCAS advisories + 3D positions.
- scripts/lib/control-pane/proximity.js: sessionsToAgents() + buildProximitySnapshot();
default working-set source shells `git diff --name-only <base>...HEAD` per
worktree (injectable for tests, fails closed to []).
- state.js: opt-in `proximity` field on the snapshot (includeProximity flag) so
the default hot path stays fast (git diffs only run when requested).
- 4 integration tests (same-file editors -> resolution, later agent steers,
<2 participants -> no advisories, labels). Full suite 2873/2873; lint green.
The interactive claim/move buttons concatenated work-item ids into inline
onclick JS with only single-quote escaping — a crafted id (ids/titles come from
GitHub sync and manual upserts, not a strict allowlist) could break out and
inject script, even on the localhost-only server.
Fix: emit the id/lane in HTML-escaped data-* attributes (escapeHtml encodes
&<>"'), attach delegated click listeners that read them via getAttribute, and
pass the raw value as a JS string arg — never concatenated into code. Adds a
regression assertion that no inline onclick handlers with interpolated ids
remain. Flagged by automated security review.
Full suite 2845/2845; lint green.
The board was read-only; you can now drive the agent+human JIT workflow from the
local control pane.
- New shared scripts/lib/control-pane/work-item-mutations.js (claimWorkItem,
moveWorkItem) so the CLI and server never diverge; work-items.js claim now
delegates to it.
- server.js: gated POST /api/work-items/:id/claim and /:id/move (localhost-only,
honors --read-only with 403). Claim sets owner + assigneeKind and moves to
running; move retargets the kanban lane.
- ui.js: per-card Claim (on unassigned cards) + lane buttons that POST and
refresh; 15s live auto-refresh (paused when the tab is hidden).
- Tests: interactive claim/move endpoints, read-only 403, invalid-lane 400, and
snapshot reflects mutations.
Full suite 2845/2845; lint green.
The kanban board tracked lanes (ready/running/blocked/done) but not WHO owns
each card, which is the missing piece for agent+human just-in-time team workflows.
- state.js: classifyAssignee() labels each work item agent | human | unassigned
(session-linked or agent-pattern owners = agent; named owners = human; ownerless
= unassigned), with an explicit metadata.assigneeKind override.
- summarizeWorkItems(): adds an assignment summary {agent,human,unassigned} over
OPEN cards plus a priority-sorted needsAssignment queue — the JIT pickup list.
- ui.js: cards show an [agent]/[human]/[unassigned] badge; the board header shows
agent/human split and 'N need owner'.
- Tests: assignment classification + JIT queue coverage in control-pane-state.
Full suite 2839/2839; lint green.
Three defense-in-depth fixes around untrusted input flowing to subprocess execution:
1. **Control-pane HTTP server (scripts/lib/control-pane/server.js)**
The local control-pane API binds to 127.0.0.1 but had no Host or Origin
validation, so a DNS-rebinding attack from a malicious website could pivot
into the loopback endpoints — including POST /api/actions/:id, which spawns
'cargo run -- graph ...' with caller-supplied query strings. Add a hostname
allowlist (loopback variants plus the explicitly configured --host) and
reject mismatched Host (421) or non-loopback Origin (403) before any route
handler runs.
2. **OpenCode git-summary tool (.opencode/tools/git-summary.ts)**
The tool was building 'git diff ${baseBranch}...HEAD --stat' with execSync
and a raw model-supplied baseBranch string. Switch run() to execFileSync
with an args array (no shell), validate baseBranch against a conservative
git-ref allowlist (rejects shell metacharacters, leading -, embedded ..),
and clamp the depth arg to a small positive integer before interpolating
into 'git log --oneline -<N>'.
3. **Reusable test workflow (.github/workflows/reusable-test.yml)**
The 'Install dependencies' step interpolated ${{ inputs.package-manager }}
directly into a bash 'case' and into an echo, so a downstream caller that
forwarded attacker-controllable input could inject into the runner. Move
the input into a PACKAGE_MANAGER env var and reference $PACKAGE_MANAGER
inside the script per the GitHub script-injection guidance.
Detected by Aeon + semgrep p/security-audit (host check via threat-model
manual-review axis; git-summary via detect-child-process; workflow via
run-shell-injection).
Verification: node tests/run-all.js — 2686/2687 pre-existing tests pass; the
one failure (observe.sh legacy output fallback) reproduces on main without
this branch applied. Added 2 new control-pane tests covering the allowlist
classifier and the DNS-rebinding-gate behavior end-to-end.
---
Filed by [Aeon](https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon-aaron).
Co-authored-by: aeonframework <aeon@aaronjmars.com>
Adds dynamic workflow/team orchestration skills, the content pack, and control-pane work-item/Kanban state DB support. Includes reviewer hardening for state-db CLI validation, optional state DB failure handling, and mergeStateStatus projection.
Affaan Mustafa