The `pull_request_target` rule's `expressionPattern` matches only
the canonical `github.event.pull_request.head.{ref,sha,repo.full_name}`
interpolations. It does not match the second canonical form of
the same exploit — fetching `refs/pull/<N>/{head,merge}` directly:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge
The merge-ref variant is what GitHub's own security guidance calls
out as the highest-severity privilege-escalation pattern under
`pull_request_target`: it materialises the PR's merge commit
(attacker code spliced with base), executes inside a workflow that
has full repo-scoped tokens, and gives the attacker the chance to
exfiltrate secrets or push to default branches. `refs/pull/N/head`
is functionally equivalent — same source, same trust boundary.
Reproduced on `main` before this commit:
$ cat /tmp/bad.yml
name: bad
on: { pull_request_target: { types: [opened] } }
permissions: { contents: read }
jobs:
do:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge
persist-credentials: false
- run: npm ci --ignore-scripts
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
$ echo $?
0
Expected: violation flagging the refs/pull checkout under pull_request_target.
Actual: passes silently.
Fix: add a `refPattern` to the `pull_request_target` rule:
/^\s*ref:\s*['"]?[^'"\n]*refs\/(?:remotes\/)?pull\/[^'"\n\s]+/m
and apply it per checkout step inside the existing
event-gated loop. The pattern matches the ref VALUE so it catches
all interpolation shapes — `refs/pull/123/head`,
`refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge`,
`${{ env.FOO }}/refs/pull/N/head` — without enumerating the
possible interpolations themselves.
Scoping: the rule is already gated on the workflow containing
`pull_request_target:`, so non-privileged `pull_request` workflows
that legitimately check out a PR ref are not affected.
After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:
ERROR: bad.yml:10 - pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository
Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
- rejects pull_request_target + refs/pull/<N>/merge
- rejects pull_request_target + hardcoded refs/pull/<N>/head
- allows pull_request_target with no `with.ref:` (base-ref checkout —
the safe pattern from GitHub's own guidance)
Test count: 17 → 20 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.
Together with the previous commit, this closes the two
independent `validate-workflow-security.js` bypasses I found.
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` in `validate-workflow-security.js`
enumerates named GitHub Actions scopes (`contents: write`,
`issues: write`, etc.) to decide whether a workflow needs to:
- disable `persist-credentials` on `actions/checkout`
- pass `--ignore-scripts` to `npm ci`
The pattern misses the top-level shorthand `permissions:
write-all`, which is the strictly broader form — it grants every
named scope write access in a single line. As a result, a
workflow that opts into write-all currently slips both gates.
Reproduced on `main` before this commit:
$ cat /tmp/bad.yml
name: bad
on: [push]
permissions: write-all
jobs:
do:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- run: npm ci
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
$ echo $?
0
Expected: at least two violations (missing `persist-credentials:
false`, missing `--ignore-scripts`).
Actual: passes silently.
Fix: add a sibling pattern `WRITE_ALL_PATTERN` that matches
`^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b` and OR it with
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` at the single gate. Both top-level
and job-level `permissions:` blocks satisfy the `^\s*` prefix.
After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:
ERROR: bad.yml:8 - workflows with write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence
ERROR: bad.yml:9 - workflows with write permissions must install npm dependencies with --ignore-scripts
Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
- rejects write-all + credential-persisting checkout
- rejects write-all + `npm ci` without `--ignore-scripts`
- allows write-all when both gates are satisfied (no over-block)
Test count: 14 → 17 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.
A separate `refs/pull/N/merge` bypass under `pull_request_target`
exists in the same validator and is fixed in the next commit.
Adds `--locale <code>` support to the ECC installer so users can install
localized reference docs (agents, commands, skills, rules) into
`~/.claude/docs/<locale>/` alongside the existing English installation.
Changes:
- manifests/install-modules.json: add 8 locale doc modules (docs-ja-JP,
docs-zh-CN, docs-ko-KR, docs-pt-BR, docs-ru, docs-tr, docs-vi-VN,
docs-zh-TW), each with kind="docs" and defaultInstall=false
- manifests/install-components.json: add 8 locale: components mapping to
the new modules
- scripts/lib/install-manifests.js: add locale: family prefix,
SUPPORTED_LOCALES, LOCALE_ALIAS_TO_COMPONENT_ID (with aliases like
ja=ja-JP, zh=zh-CN, ko=ko-KR), and listSupportedLocales()
- scripts/lib/install/request.js: add --locale flag to parseInstallArgs(),
resolve locale alias → component ID in normalizeInstallRequest(), throw
on unsupported locale codes
- scripts/lib/install-targets/claude-home.js: map docs/<locale>/ source
paths to ~/.claude/docs/<locale>/ destination (side-by-side, no overwrite
of English files)
- scripts/install-apply.js: import listSupportedLocales, add --locale
usage line and available locales list to --help output
Usage examples:
./install.sh --locale ja # Japanese docs only
./install.sh --profile core --locale zh-CN # core profile + zh-CN docs
./install.sh typescript --locale ja # legacy + locale (errors)
- Replace blinking red (5;31m) with bold red (1;31m) for critical context bar
- Replace cyan metrics (36m) with sky blue (38;5;117m)
- Replace plain bold task (1m) with bold bright white (1;97m)
- Update test assertion to match new bold red code
Salvages the useful parts of #1897 without generated .caliber state or stale counts.
- adds a deterministic command registry generator and drift check
- commits the current command registry for 75 commands
- validates the rc.1 README catalog summary against live counts
- adds a single Ubuntu Node 20 coverage job instead of running coverage in every matrix cell
Co-authored-by: jodunk <jodunk@users.noreply.github.com>
Make the ECC 2.0 GitHub/Linear/handoff/roadmap progress-sync model part of the local observability readiness gate instead of leaving it as roadmap prose only.
- add `docs/architecture/progress-sync-contract.md` for GitHub, Linear, handoff, roadmap, and work-items sync
- add a `Tracker Sync` check to `scripts/observability-readiness.js`
- update observability tests with passing and missing-contract coverage
- update observability and GA roadmap docs so the local readiness gate is now 18/18 and records #1848 supply-chain hardening evidence
Validation:
- node tests/scripts/observability-readiness.test.js (9 passed, 0 failed)
- npm run observability:ready -- --format json (18/18, ready true)
- npx markdownlint-cli 'docs/architecture/progress-sync-contract.md' 'docs/architecture/observability-readiness.md' 'docs/ECC-2.0-GA-ROADMAP.md'
- git diff --check
- node tests/docs/ecc2-release-surface.test.js (18 passed)
- node tests/run-all.js (2378 passed, 0 failed)
- GitHub CI for #1849 green across Ubuntu, Windows, and macOS
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