greptile P2 nitpick: the previous commit's docblock said "on every
PreToolUse hook" but the module header (and the actual hook wiring
in `hooks/hooks.json`) identifies this script as a PostToolUse
hook — it runs *after* each tool invocation to update the running
session aggregate. One-word typo, no behavior change.
coderabbitai flagged: the two `catch` blocks in `readSessionCost`
silently swallowed every failure mode. A malformed `costs.jsonl`
row, a permission error opening the file, or any other unexpected
I/O failure would silently return zero cost — masking real
problems and feeding stale or zero numbers into
`ecc-context-monitor.js` (which then injects them as
`additionalContext` into the live model turn).
Fix two things, both fail-open-preserving:
1. **Inner JSON.parse catch** — count malformed lines and write
one aggregated breadcrumb per call:
[ecc-metrics-bridge] skipped N malformed line(s) in <path>
Aggregating (rather than per-line) keeps a log-flooded
`costs.jsonl` diagnosable without overwhelming stderr.
2. **Outer fs.readFileSync catch** — write a breadcrumb on real
errors, but stay silent on `ENOENT`. The "no costs.jsonl yet"
case is genuinely normal (no Stop event has fired this session)
and producing noise on every PreToolUse before the first Stop
would be reviewer-visible spam. All other error codes
(`EACCES`, `EISDIR`, `EMFILE`, …) get:
[ecc-metrics-bridge] failing open after <name> reading <path>: <msg>
In both cases the function still returns the zero-cost fallback
so the bridge never breaks tool execution — only the
diagnosability changes.
Two new regression tests in
`tests/hooks/ecc-metrics-bridge.test.js`:
✓ readSessionCost writes a stderr breadcrumb when malformed
lines are skipped — feeds 4 rows (2 valid, 2 malformed),
asserts the last valid row still wins AND captured stderr
contains "skipped 2 malformed line(s)".
✓ readSessionCost stays silent when costs.jsonl does not exist
(ENOENT) — uses a fresh tmp HOME with no metrics dir, asserts
zero return AND empty stderr.
Test count: 16 → 18; `npm test` green; `yarn lint` clean.
`readSessionCost` read only the trailing 8 KiB of
`~/.claude/metrics/costs.jsonl` to "avoid scanning entire file".
That ceiling is the opposite-sign sibling of the double-count bug
fixed in the previous commit: once a session's most recent
cumulative row gets pushed past the 8 KiB window by newer rows
from other sessions, the bridge silently reports `totalCost: 0`,
`totalIn: 0`, `totalOut: 0` for that session — same false signal
to `ecc-context-monitor.js`, same wrong number injected into the
live model turn as `additionalContext`.
`cost-tracker.js` has no rotation policy, so on any non-trivial
workstation costs.jsonl grows past 8 KiB within minutes of normal
use. For users who keep multiple concurrent sessions, this means
the second-and-later sessions silently report zero almost
immediately.
Reproduced before this commit:
$ HOME=/tmp/eccc node -e '
const fs = require("fs");
const m = require("./scripts/hooks/ecc-metrics-bridge.js");
// S1 row at file start, then 200 rows of OTHER-session noise (~16 KiB).
// S1 is the row we want, but it sits past the 8 KiB tail.
const s1 = `{"session_id":"S1","estimated_cost_usd":0.5,"input_tokens":500,"output_tokens":250}`;
const other = `{"session_id":"OTHER","estimated_cost_usd":1,"input_tokens":100,"output_tokens":50}`;
fs.mkdirSync("/tmp/eccc/.claude/metrics", { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync("/tmp/eccc/.claude/metrics/costs.jsonl",
[s1, ...Array(200).fill(other)].join("\\n") + "\\n");
console.log(JSON.stringify(m.readSessionCost("S1")));'
{"totalCost":0,"totalIn":0,"totalOut":0}
Expected: `{"totalCost":0.5, "totalIn":500, "totalOut":250}` (the
S1 row that exists in the file).
Actual: zero — the row is past the 8 KiB tail.
Fix: drop the `fs.openSync` + bounded `fs.readSync` + position
arithmetic in favour of `fs.readFileSync(costsPath, 'utf8')` and
iterate every line. Each row is ~150 bytes; even 100k rows is
~15 MB and a single sync read on PreToolUse is in the low ms.
If file rotation lands in `cost-tracker.js` later, this scan
becomes proportionally cheaper.
After this commit the reproduction above returns
`{"totalCost":0.5, "totalIn":500, "totalOut":250}`.
Regression test in `tests/hooks/ecc-metrics-bridge.test.js`:
`readSessionCost finds session row beyond the old 8 KiB tail
boundary`. The test asserts the costs.jsonl fixture is > 8 KiB
before reading so any reintroduction of a bounded tail would
re-fail the test (i.e. the assertion is the contract, not the
specific number 8192).
Together with the previous commit, both directions of the
metrics-bridge cost-reporting bug are closed.
`ecc-metrics-bridge.js#readSessionCost` summed the
`estimated_cost_usd`, `input_tokens`, and `output_tokens` of
every matching row in `~/.claude/metrics/costs.jsonl`. That breaks
the documented contract of `scripts/hooks/cost-tracker.js`, which
explicitly states (in its module docblock):
Cumulative behavior: Stop fires per assistant response, not
per session. Each row therefore represents the cumulative
session total up to that point. To get per-session cost, take
the last row per session_id.
Summing N cumulative rows over-counts by roughly (N+1)/2 ×. For a
session with 3 rows at 0.01, 0.02, 0.03 USD (true running total
0.03), the bridge today reports 0.06 USD. The over-counted value
feeds `ecc-context-monitor.js`, which then trips its
COST_NOTICE_USD / COST_WARNING_USD / COST_CRITICAL_USD thresholds
on phantom spend AND injects the inflated number as
`additionalContext` into the live model turn — so the agent
itself is told a wrong cost.
Reproduced on `main` before this commit:
$ cat > /tmp/eccc/.claude/metrics/costs.jsonl <<EOF
{"session_id":"S1","estimated_cost_usd":0.01,"input_tokens":333,"output_tokens":166}
{"session_id":"S1","estimated_cost_usd":0.02,"input_tokens":666,"output_tokens":333}
{"session_id":"S1","estimated_cost_usd":0.03,"input_tokens":1000,"output_tokens":500}
EOF
$ HOME=/tmp/eccc node -e 'const m = require("./scripts/hooks/ecc-metrics-bridge.js"); \
console.log(JSON.stringify(m.readSessionCost("S1")))'
{"totalCost":0.06,"totalIn":1999,"totalOut":999}
Expected: `{"totalCost":0.03,"totalIn":1000,"totalOut":500}` (the
last cumulative row).
Actual: 2× over-count.
Fix: replace `+=` with `=` in the matching branch so the assigned
values reflect the most recent row encountered. The iteration
order is file order, which is also event time order, so the last
assignment wins — exactly the contract cost-tracker writes
against.
After this commit the reproduction above returns
`{"totalCost":0.03,"totalIn":1000,"totalOut":500}`.
Regression test in `tests/hooks/ecc-metrics-bridge.test.js`:
`readSessionCost returns the LAST cumulative row, not the sum
(cost-tracker contract)`. The existing
`readSessionCost does not include unrelated default-session rows`
test happened to pass even with the bug because it only had one
target-session row — single-row sessions are coincidentally
correct under both formulas. The new test uses three rows so the
two formulas diverge.
A second issue in the same function — the 8 KiB tail-only read
silently drops older rows once a session's recent cumulative
totals scroll past that window — is fixed in the next commit.
Two round-1 review findings, fixed together because they touch the
same regex/loop region of `findViolations`:
1. **cubic P0 — quoted write-all bypass**.
`WRITE_ALL_PATTERN` was `/^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b/m`, which
does not match the perfectly valid YAML forms
`permissions: "write-all"` and `permissions: 'write-all'`. A
workflow that quoted the shorthand slipped right through the
persist-credentials gate the previous commit was supposed to close.
Reproduced before this commit:
$ cat /tmp/q.yml
name: bad
on: [push]
permissions: "write-all"
jobs:
do:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
exit=0
Fix: tighten the regex to
/^\s*permissions:\s*["']?write-all["']?\s*$/m
which accepts the bare, double-quoted, and single-quoted YAML forms
while still anchoring on the `permissions:` key. The trailing `\s*$`
prevents accidentally matching keys whose value happens to start
with `write-all` (e.g. some future literal `write-all-something`).
2. **greptile P2 — duplicate violation when both patterns match**.
A `ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}/merge`
value matches both the `pull_request_target` rule's
`expressionPattern` (the `head.sha` interpolation) and its
`refPattern` (the `refs/pull/` literal). Each push generates an
ERROR line with the same description and just a different
`expression:` echo, so the reviewer sees the same violation twice.
Fix: track `stepFlagged` inside the per-step loop and skip the
`refPattern` fallback once any `expressionPattern` match has already
produced a violation for this step. The `refPattern` is a fallback
for ref-only forms (`refs/pull/123/head`, `${{ env.X }}` whose
resolved value is a PR ref); when the more specific expression
already fires, the fallback is redundant by definition.
After both fixes, the round-1 reproductions resolve cleanly:
$ # quoted form now blocks
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp/q1/.github/workflows node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
ERROR: quoted.yml:8 - workflows with write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence
exit=1
$ # combined head.sha + refs/pull now prints one ERROR, not two
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp/q2/.github/workflows node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
ERROR: dup.yml:10 - pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository
Unsafe expression: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
exit=1
Test additions land in the next commit.
The `pull_request_target` rule's `expressionPattern` matches only
the canonical `github.event.pull_request.head.{ref,sha,repo.full_name}`
interpolations. It does not match the second canonical form of
the same exploit — fetching `refs/pull/<N>/{head,merge}` directly:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge
The merge-ref variant is what GitHub's own security guidance calls
out as the highest-severity privilege-escalation pattern under
`pull_request_target`: it materialises the PR's merge commit
(attacker code spliced with base), executes inside a workflow that
has full repo-scoped tokens, and gives the attacker the chance to
exfiltrate secrets or push to default branches. `refs/pull/N/head`
is functionally equivalent — same source, same trust boundary.
Reproduced on `main` before this commit:
$ cat /tmp/bad.yml
name: bad
on: { pull_request_target: { types: [opened] } }
permissions: { contents: read }
jobs:
do:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge
persist-credentials: false
- run: npm ci --ignore-scripts
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
$ echo $?
0
Expected: violation flagging the refs/pull checkout under pull_request_target.
Actual: passes silently.
Fix: add a `refPattern` to the `pull_request_target` rule:
/^\s*ref:\s*['"]?[^'"\n]*refs\/(?:remotes\/)?pull\/[^'"\n\s]+/m
and apply it per checkout step inside the existing
event-gated loop. The pattern matches the ref VALUE so it catches
all interpolation shapes — `refs/pull/123/head`,
`refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge`,
`${{ env.FOO }}/refs/pull/N/head` — without enumerating the
possible interpolations themselves.
Scoping: the rule is already gated on the workflow containing
`pull_request_target:`, so non-privileged `pull_request` workflows
that legitimately check out a PR ref are not affected.
After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:
ERROR: bad.yml:10 - pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository
Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
- rejects pull_request_target + refs/pull/<N>/merge
- rejects pull_request_target + hardcoded refs/pull/<N>/head
- allows pull_request_target with no `with.ref:` (base-ref checkout —
the safe pattern from GitHub's own guidance)
Test count: 17 → 20 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.
Together with the previous commit, this closes the two
independent `validate-workflow-security.js` bypasses I found.
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` in `validate-workflow-security.js`
enumerates named GitHub Actions scopes (`contents: write`,
`issues: write`, etc.) to decide whether a workflow needs to:
- disable `persist-credentials` on `actions/checkout`
- pass `--ignore-scripts` to `npm ci`
The pattern misses the top-level shorthand `permissions:
write-all`, which is the strictly broader form — it grants every
named scope write access in a single line. As a result, a
workflow that opts into write-all currently slips both gates.
Reproduced on `main` before this commit:
$ cat /tmp/bad.yml
name: bad
on: [push]
permissions: write-all
jobs:
do:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- run: npm ci
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
$ echo $?
0
Expected: at least two violations (missing `persist-credentials:
false`, missing `--ignore-scripts`).
Actual: passes silently.
Fix: add a sibling pattern `WRITE_ALL_PATTERN` that matches
`^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b` and OR it with
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` at the single gate. Both top-level
and job-level `permissions:` blocks satisfy the `^\s*` prefix.
After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:
ERROR: bad.yml:8 - workflows with write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence
ERROR: bad.yml:9 - workflows with write permissions must install npm dependencies with --ignore-scripts
Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
- rejects write-all + credential-persisting checkout
- rejects write-all + `npm ci` without `--ignore-scripts`
- allows write-all when both gates are satisfied (no over-block)
Test count: 14 → 17 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.
A separate `refs/pull/N/merge` bypass under `pull_request_target`
exists in the same validator and is fixed in the next commit.
Adds `--locale <code>` support to the ECC installer so users can install
localized reference docs (agents, commands, skills, rules) into
`~/.claude/docs/<locale>/` alongside the existing English installation.
Changes:
- manifests/install-modules.json: add 8 locale doc modules (docs-ja-JP,
docs-zh-CN, docs-ko-KR, docs-pt-BR, docs-ru, docs-tr, docs-vi-VN,
docs-zh-TW), each with kind="docs" and defaultInstall=false
- manifests/install-components.json: add 8 locale: components mapping to
the new modules
- scripts/lib/install-manifests.js: add locale: family prefix,
SUPPORTED_LOCALES, LOCALE_ALIAS_TO_COMPONENT_ID (with aliases like
ja=ja-JP, zh=zh-CN, ko=ko-KR), and listSupportedLocales()
- scripts/lib/install/request.js: add --locale flag to parseInstallArgs(),
resolve locale alias → component ID in normalizeInstallRequest(), throw
on unsupported locale codes
- scripts/lib/install-targets/claude-home.js: map docs/<locale>/ source
paths to ~/.claude/docs/<locale>/ destination (side-by-side, no overwrite
of English files)
- scripts/install-apply.js: import listSupportedLocales, add --locale
usage line and available locales list to --help output
Usage examples:
./install.sh --locale ja # Japanese docs only
./install.sh --profile core --locale zh-CN # core profile + zh-CN docs
./install.sh typescript --locale ja # legacy + locale (errors)
- Replace blinking red (5;31m) with bold red (1;31m) for critical context bar
- Replace cyan metrics (36m) with sky blue (38;5;117m)
- Replace plain bold task (1m) with bold bright white (1;97m)
- Update test assertion to match new bold red code
