Files
everything-claude-code/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
Jamkris 231c1fdbe8 fix: close gateguard destructive-bash regex bypasses with tokenizer
Six classes of bypass in scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
DESTRUCTIVE_BASH regex, plus a separate false-positive class.
Same shape of issue as the block-no-verify holes addressed in
#1843: a single-regex shell parser can never cover the flag-order
variations git and rm allow.

Real bypasses observed locally (all ALLOW today, should BLOCK):

  git push -f origin main                       (short form of --force)
  git -c core.foo=bar reset --hard              (intervening -c global)
  rm -fr /tmp/junk                              (reverse flag order)
  rm -r -f /tmp/junk                            (split flag form)
  git reset HEAD --hard                         (intervening ref token)
  git clean -fd                                 (combined -f + -d flag)

False positive observed locally (BLOCK today, should ALLOW):

  git commit -m "fix: rm -rf race in worker"   (destructive phrase
                                                inside quoted message)

Behavior fix that comes along: --force-if-includes is now exempted
alongside --force-with-lease. Both are safety-checked variants;
the previous regex used a negative lookahead that only spelled out
--with-lease, so --force-if-includes blocked under the old code
even though it is the safer-not-harder choice.

Fix shape (mirrors block-no-verify #1843):

  - DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD regex kept for `drop table`, `delete from`,
    `truncate`, `dd if=` — these are stable keyword phrases. Quoted
    strings are stripped before the regex runs so the phrase is not
    matched inside a commit message body.
  - isDestructiveBash() tokenizes the command into segments at
    unquoted ; | & boundaries, then per segment:
      * isDestructiveRm  — detects `rm` with both r and f set
        across combined or split flag tokens.
      * isDestructiveGit — finds the git subcommand after skipping
        global options (-c key=val, -C path, --git-dir=, etc.),
        then handles reset, checkout --, clean -f*, push --force
        (with --force-with-lease / --force-if-includes exemption),
        commit --amend, and rm -r* preservation.
  - Command tokens go through commandBasename() so /usr/bin/rm,
    rm.exe, and RM all normalize to "rm".

Tests (+10 in tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js):

  Bypass-now-blocked (7):
    - denies short-form git push -f
    - denies git reset --hard with intervening -c global option
    - denies rm -fr (reverse flag order)
    - denies rm -r -f (split flag form)
    - denies git reset HEAD --hard
    - denies git clean -fd
    - denies destructive command in second chained segment

  False-positive-now-allowed (3):
    - allows destructive phrase inside `-m` commit message (rm -rf)
    - allows SQL phrase inside `-m` commit message (drop table)
    - allows --force-if-includes as a safety-checked variant

Local verification:
  yarn lint                                                 clean
  scripts/ci/validate-*  (agents/commands/rules/skills/hooks/
                          install-manifests/no-personal-paths)  pass
  node tests/run-all.js                              2380/2380 pass

Caveat (unrelated): yarn test still fails at check-unicode-safety
on skills/windows-desktop-e2e/SKILL.md (U+2605) per #1843's
caveat — independent of this change.

Provenance: discovered during a security pass on ECC after PR
#1843 (block-no-verify shell-words rewrite) landed. Same class of
regex-based shell parser issue, same shape of fix.

Refs #1843.
2026-05-13 14:54:27 +09:00

722 lines
22 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* PreToolUse Hook: GateGuard Fact-Forcing Gate
*
* Forces Claude to investigate before editing files or running commands.
* Instead of asking "are you sure?" (which LLMs always answer "yes"),
* this hook demands concrete facts: importers, public API, data schemas.
*
* The act of investigation creates awareness that self-evaluation never did.
*
* Gates:
* - Edit/Write: list importers, affected API, verify data schemas, quote instruction
* - Bash (destructive): list targets, rollback plan, quote instruction
* - Bash (routine): quote current instruction (once per session)
*
* Compatible with run-with-flags.js via module.exports.run().
* Cross-platform (Windows, macOS, Linux).
*
* Full package with config support: pip install gateguard-ai
* Repo: https://github.com/zunoworks/gateguard
*/
'use strict';
const crypto = require('crypto');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
// Session state — scoped per session to avoid cross-session races.
const STATE_DIR = process.env.GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR || path.join(process.env.HOME || process.env.USERPROFILE || '/tmp', '.gateguard');
let activeStateFile = null;
// State expires after 30 minutes of inactivity
const SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000;
const READ_HEARTBEAT_MS = 60 * 1000;
// Maximum checked entries to prevent unbounded growth
const MAX_CHECKED_ENTRIES = 500;
const MAX_SESSION_KEYS = 50;
const ROUTINE_BASH_SESSION_KEY = '__bash_session__';
const EDIT_WRITE_HOOK_ID = 'pre:edit-write:gateguard-fact-force';
const BASH_HOOK_ID = 'pre:bash:gateguard-fact-force';
const ECC_DISABLE_VALUES = new Set(['0', 'false', 'off', 'disabled', 'disable']);
// SQL-keyword + dd patterns stay as a single regex — they are stable
// phrases without shell-flag ordering concerns. Quoted strings are
// stripped before this regex runs so a commit message mentioning
// "drop table" no longer triggers a false positive.
const DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD = /\b(drop\s+table|delete\s+from|truncate|dd\s+if=)\b/i;
/**
* Strip the contents of single- and double-quoted strings so phrases
* mentioned inside a commit message or echoed argument do not trigger
* the destructive detector. Mirrors the approach used by
* block-no-verify.js.
*
* @param {string} input
* @returns {string}
*/
function stripQuotedStrings(input) {
return input
.replace(/'(?:[^'\\]|\\.)*'/g, "''")
.replace(/"(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*"/g, '""');
}
/**
* Split a command line into top-level segments at unquoted shell
* separators (`;`, `|`, `&`, `&&`, `||`). Quoted strings are stripped
* first so separators inside quotes are not split on. Per-segment
* comments are also stripped.
*
* @param {string} input
* @returns {string[]}
*/
function splitCommandSegments(input) {
const stripped = stripQuotedStrings(input);
return stripped
.split(/[;|&]+/)
.map(segment => segment.replace(/(^|\s)#.*/, '$1').trim())
.filter(Boolean);
}
/**
* Tokenize a single command segment by whitespace. Quoted strings
* are already collapsed to empty quotes by `stripQuotedStrings`, so
* naive whitespace splitting is sufficient.
*
* @param {string} segment
* @returns {string[]}
*/
function tokenize(segment) {
return segment.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean);
}
/**
* Strip a leading path and trailing `.exe` from a command token so
* `/usr/bin/git`, `git.exe`, and `GIT` all normalize to `git`.
*
* @param {string} token
* @returns {string}
*/
function commandBasename(token) {
if (!token) return '';
return token.replace(/^.*[\\/]/, '').replace(/\.exe$/i, '').toLowerCase();
}
/**
* Detect `rm` invocations that recursively force-delete files. Handles
* combined (`-rf`, `-fr`, `-Rf`) and split (`-r -f`) flag forms.
*
* @param {string[]} tokens
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function isDestructiveRm(tokens) {
if (tokens.length === 0 || commandBasename(tokens[0]) !== 'rm') return false;
let hasR = false;
let hasF = false;
for (const t of tokens.slice(1)) {
if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) continue;
const body = t.slice(1);
if (/[rR]/.test(body)) hasR = true;
if (/f/.test(body)) hasF = true;
}
return hasR && hasF;
}
/**
* Locate the git subcommand within a token list, skipping over git's
* global options like `-c key=value`, `-C <path>`, `--git-dir=...`,
* `--work-tree=...`, `--namespace=...`, `--super-prefix=...`.
*
* @param {string[]} tokens
* @returns {{ command: string, rest: string[] } | null}
*/
function findGitSubcommand(tokens) {
if (tokens.length === 0 || commandBasename(tokens[0]) !== 'git') return null;
const valueConsumingShort = new Set(['-c', '-C']);
const valueConsumingLong = new Set(['--git-dir', '--work-tree', '--namespace', '--super-prefix']);
let i = 1;
while (i < tokens.length) {
const t = tokens[i];
if (valueConsumingShort.has(t) || valueConsumingLong.has(t)) {
i += 2;
continue;
}
if (t.startsWith('--git-dir=') || t.startsWith('--work-tree=') || t.startsWith('--namespace=') || t.startsWith('--super-prefix=')) {
i += 1;
continue;
}
if (t.startsWith('-')) {
// Unknown global option — skip without consuming a value.
i += 1;
continue;
}
return { command: t.toLowerCase(), rest: tokens.slice(i + 1) };
}
return null;
}
/**
* Detect destructive `git` invocations: `reset --hard`, `checkout --`,
* `clean -f...`, `push --force` (but not `--force-with-lease`),
* `commit --amend`, `rm -rf`.
*
* @param {string[]} tokens
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function isDestructiveGit(tokens) {
const sub = findGitSubcommand(tokens);
if (!sub) return false;
const { command, rest } = sub;
if (command === 'reset') {
return rest.includes('--hard');
}
if (command === 'checkout') {
return rest.includes('--');
}
if (command === 'clean') {
// `git clean -f`, `-fd`, `-fdx`, `-df`, `--force`
return rest.some(t => {
if (t === '--force') return true;
if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) return false;
return t.slice(1).includes('f');
});
}
if (command === 'push') {
// `--force-with-lease` and `--force-if-includes` are safety-checked
// force variants; anything else with -f or bare --force is the
// destructive form. The original regex blocked --force-if-includes
// because its negative-lookahead only spelled out --force-with-lease;
// we exempt both here since their intent is the safe path.
let safe = false;
let force = false;
for (const t of rest) {
if (
t === '--force-with-lease'
|| t.startsWith('--force-with-lease=')
|| t === '--force-if-includes'
|| t.startsWith('--force-if-includes=')
) {
safe = true;
continue;
}
if (t === '--force' || t.startsWith('--force=')) {
force = true;
continue;
}
if (t.startsWith('-') && !t.startsWith('--') && t.slice(1).includes('f')) {
force = true;
}
}
return force && !safe;
}
if (command === 'commit') {
return rest.includes('--amend');
}
if (command === 'rm') {
// `git rm -r` / `-rf` / `-r -f` — destructive within the index too.
let hasR = false;
for (const t of rest) {
if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) continue;
if (/[rR]/.test(t.slice(1))) hasR = true;
}
return hasR;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Decide whether a bash command line contains a destructive action
* the fact-forcing gate should challenge. Combines SQL-keyword
* detection (regex on quote-stripped input) with per-segment shell
* tokenization for shell commands.
*
* @param {string} command
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function isDestructiveBash(command) {
const stripped = stripQuotedStrings(String(command || ''));
if (DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD.test(stripped)) return true;
for (const segment of splitCommandSegments(command)) {
const tokens = tokenize(segment);
if (isDestructiveRm(tokens)) return true;
if (isDestructiveGit(tokens)) return true;
}
return false;
}
// --- State management (per-session, atomic writes, bounded) ---
function normalizeEnvValue(value) {
return String(value || '').trim().toLowerCase();
}
function isGateGuardDisabled() {
if (normalizeEnvValue(process.env.GATEGUARD_DISABLED) === '1') {
return true;
}
return ECC_DISABLE_VALUES.has(normalizeEnvValue(process.env.ECC_GATEGUARD));
}
function sanitizeSessionKey(value) {
const raw = String(value || '').trim();
if (!raw) {
return '';
}
const sanitized = raw.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, '_');
if (sanitized && sanitized.length <= 64) {
return sanitized;
}
return hashSessionKey('sid', raw);
}
function hashSessionKey(prefix, value) {
return `${prefix}-${crypto.createHash('sha256').update(String(value)).digest('hex').slice(0, 24)}`;
}
function resolveSessionKey(data) {
const directCandidates = [data && data.session_id, data && data.sessionId, data && data.session && data.session.id, process.env.CLAUDE_SESSION_ID, process.env.ECC_SESSION_ID];
for (const candidate of directCandidates) {
const sanitized = sanitizeSessionKey(candidate);
if (sanitized) {
return sanitized;
}
}
const transcriptPath = (data && (data.transcript_path || data.transcriptPath)) || process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;
if (transcriptPath && String(transcriptPath).trim()) {
return hashSessionKey('tx', path.resolve(String(transcriptPath).trim()));
}
const projectFingerprint = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR || process.cwd();
return hashSessionKey('proj', path.resolve(projectFingerprint));
}
function getStateFile(data) {
if (!activeStateFile) {
const sessionKey = resolveSessionKey(data);
activeStateFile = path.join(STATE_DIR, `state-${sessionKey}.json`);
}
return activeStateFile;
}
function loadState() {
const stateFile = getStateFile();
try {
if (fs.existsSync(stateFile)) {
const state = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8'));
const lastActive = state.last_active || 0;
if (Date.now() - lastActive > SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS) {
try {
fs.unlinkSync(stateFile);
} catch (_) {
/* ignore */
}
return { checked: [], last_active: Date.now() };
}
return state;
}
} catch (_) {
/* ignore */
}
return { checked: [], last_active: Date.now() };
}
function pruneCheckedEntries(checked) {
if (checked.length <= MAX_CHECKED_ENTRIES) {
return checked;
}
const preserved = checked.includes(ROUTINE_BASH_SESSION_KEY) ? [ROUTINE_BASH_SESSION_KEY] : [];
const sessionKeys = checked.filter(k => k.startsWith('__') && k !== ROUTINE_BASH_SESSION_KEY);
const fileKeys = checked.filter(k => !k.startsWith('__'));
const remainingSessionSlots = Math.max(MAX_SESSION_KEYS - preserved.length, 0);
const cappedSession = sessionKeys.slice(-remainingSessionSlots);
const remainingFileSlots = Math.max(MAX_CHECKED_ENTRIES - preserved.length - cappedSession.length, 0);
const cappedFiles = fileKeys.slice(-remainingFileSlots);
return [...preserved, ...cappedSession, ...cappedFiles];
}
function saveState(state) {
const stateFile = getStateFile();
let tmpFile = null;
try {
fs.mkdirSync(STATE_DIR, { recursive: true });
let mergedChecked = Array.isArray(state.checked) ? state.checked : [];
let mergedLastActive = typeof state.last_active === 'number' ? state.last_active : 0;
try {
if (fs.existsSync(stateFile)) {
const diskState = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8'));
if (Array.isArray(diskState.checked)) {
mergedChecked = Array.from(new Set([...diskState.checked, ...mergedChecked]));
}
if (typeof diskState.last_active === 'number') {
mergedLastActive = Math.max(mergedLastActive, diskState.last_active);
}
}
} catch (_) {
/* ignore malformed or transient disk state */
}
const finalState = {
checked: pruneCheckedEntries(mergedChecked),
last_active: Math.max(mergedLastActive, Date.now())
};
// Atomic write: temp file + rename prevents partial reads
tmpFile = `${stateFile}.tmp.${process.pid}.${crypto.randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`;
fs.writeFileSync(tmpFile, JSON.stringify(finalState, null, 2), 'utf8');
try {
fs.renameSync(tmpFile, stateFile);
} catch (error) {
if (error && (error.code === 'EEXIST' || error.code === 'EPERM')) {
try {
fs.unlinkSync(stateFile);
} catch (_) {
/* ignore */
}
fs.renameSync(tmpFile, stateFile);
} else {
throw error;
}
}
tmpFile = null;
return true;
} catch (_) {
if (tmpFile) {
try {
fs.unlinkSync(tmpFile);
} catch (_) {
/* ignore */
}
}
return false;
}
}
function markChecked(key) {
const state = loadState();
if (!state.checked.includes(key)) {
state.checked.push(key);
return saveState(state);
}
return true;
}
function isChecked(key) {
const state = loadState();
const found = state.checked.includes(key);
if (found && Date.now() - (state.last_active || 0) > READ_HEARTBEAT_MS) {
saveState(state);
}
return found;
}
// Prune stale session files older than 1 hour
(function pruneStaleFiles() {
try {
const files = fs.readdirSync(STATE_DIR);
const now = Date.now();
for (const f of files) {
const isStateFile = f.startsWith('state-') && (f.endsWith('.json') || f.includes('.json.tmp.'));
if (!isStateFile) continue;
const fp = path.join(STATE_DIR, f);
try {
const stat = fs.statSync(fp);
if (now - stat.mtimeMs > SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS * 2) {
fs.unlinkSync(fp);
}
} catch (_) {
// Ignore files that disappear between readdir/stat/unlink.
}
}
} catch (_) {
/* ignore */
}
})();
// --- Sanitize file path against injection ---
function sanitizePath(filePath) {
// Strip control chars (including null), bidi overrides, and newlines
let sanitized = '';
for (const char of String(filePath || '')) {
const code = char.codePointAt(0);
const isAsciiControl = code <= 0x1f || code === 0x7f;
const isBidiOverride = (code >= 0x200e && code <= 0x200f) || (code >= 0x202a && code <= 0x202e) || (code >= 0x2066 && code <= 0x2069);
sanitized += isAsciiControl || isBidiOverride ? ' ' : char;
}
return sanitized.trim().slice(0, 500);
}
function normalizeForMatch(value) {
return String(value || '')
.replace(/\\/g, '/')
.toLowerCase();
}
function isClaudeSettingsPath(filePath) {
const normalized = normalizeForMatch(filePath);
return /(^|\/)\.claude\/settings(?:\.[^/]+)?\.json$/.test(normalized);
}
function isReadOnlyGitIntrospection(command) {
const trimmed = String(command || '').trim();
if (!trimmed || /[\r\n;&|><`$()]/.test(trimmed)) {
return false;
}
const tokens = trimmed.split(/\s+/);
if (tokens[0] !== 'git' || tokens.length < 2) {
return false;
}
const subcommand = tokens[1].toLowerCase();
const args = tokens.slice(2);
if (subcommand === 'status') {
return args.every(arg => ['--porcelain', '--short', '--branch'].includes(arg));
}
if (subcommand === 'diff') {
return args.length <= 1 && args.every(arg => ['--name-only', '--name-status'].includes(arg));
}
if (subcommand === 'log') {
return args.every(arg => arg === '--oneline' || /^--max-count=\d+$/.test(arg));
}
if (subcommand === 'show') {
return args.length === 1 && !args[0].startsWith('--') && /^[a-zA-Z0-9._:/-]+$/.test(args[0]);
}
if (subcommand === 'branch') {
return args.length === 1 && args[0] === '--show-current';
}
if (subcommand === 'rev-parse') {
return args.length === 2 && args[0] === '--abbrev-ref' && /^head$/i.test(args[1]);
}
return false;
}
// --- Gate messages ---
function editGateMsg(filePath) {
const safe = sanitizePath(filePath);
return [
'[Fact-Forcing Gate]',
'',
`Before editing ${safe}, present these facts:`,
'',
'1. List ALL files that import/require this file (use Grep)',
'2. List the public functions/classes affected by this change',
'3. If this file reads/writes data files, show field names, structure, and date format (use redacted or synthetic values, not raw production data)',
"4. Quote the user's current instruction verbatim",
'',
'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.'
].join('\n');
}
function writeGateMsg(filePath) {
const safe = sanitizePath(filePath);
return [
'[Fact-Forcing Gate]',
'',
`Before creating ${safe}, present these facts:`,
'',
'1. Name the file(s) and line(s) that will call this new file',
'2. Confirm no existing file serves the same purpose (use Glob)',
'3. If this file reads/writes data files, show field names, structure, and date format (use redacted or synthetic values, not raw production data)',
"4. Quote the user's current instruction verbatim",
'',
'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.'
].join('\n');
}
function destructiveBashMsg() {
return [
'[Fact-Forcing Gate]',
'',
'Destructive command detected. Before running, present:',
'',
'1. List all files/data this command will modify or delete',
'2. Write a one-line rollback procedure',
"3. Quote the user's current instruction verbatim",
'',
'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.'
].join('\n');
}
function routineBashMsg() {
return [
'[Fact-Forcing Gate]',
'',
'Before the first Bash command this session, present these facts:',
'',
'1. The current user request in one sentence',
'2. What this specific command verifies or produces',
'',
'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.'
].join('\n');
}
function withRecoveryHint(message, hookIds = [EDIT_WRITE_HOOK_ID]) {
const disableTargets = hookIds.map(hookId => `\`${hookId}\``).join(' or ');
return [
message,
'',
`Recovery: if GateGuard is blocking setup or repair work, run this session with \`ECC_GATEGUARD=off\` or add ${disableTargets} to \`ECC_DISABLED_HOOKS\`.`
].join('\n');
}
function isSubagentInvocation(data) {
if (!data || typeof data !== 'object') {
return false;
}
const candidates = [
data.agent_id,
data.agentId,
data.parent_tool_use_id,
data.parentToolUseId
];
return candidates.some(candidate => typeof candidate === 'string' && candidate.trim());
}
// --- Deny helper ---
function denyResult(reason, options = {}) {
const includeRecoveryHint = options.includeRecoveryHint !== false;
const hookIds = Array.isArray(options.hookIds) && options.hookIds.length > 0 ? options.hookIds : [EDIT_WRITE_HOOK_ID];
return {
stdout: JSON.stringify({
hookSpecificOutput: {
hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
permissionDecision: 'deny',
permissionDecisionReason: includeRecoveryHint ? withRecoveryHint(reason, hookIds) : reason
}
}),
exitCode: 0
};
}
function allowWithStateWarning() {
return {
stderr: '[Fact-Forcing Gate] GateGuard state could not be persisted; allowing this operation to avoid a permanent retry loop. Check GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR or filesystem permissions.',
exitCode: 0
};
}
// --- Core logic (exported for run-with-flags.js) ---
function run(rawInput) {
let data;
try {
data = typeof rawInput === 'string' ? JSON.parse(rawInput) : rawInput;
} catch (_) {
return rawInput; // allow on parse error
}
if (isGateGuardDisabled()) {
return rawInput;
}
activeStateFile = null;
getStateFile(data);
const rawToolName = data.tool_name || '';
const toolInput = data.tool_input || {};
// Normalize: case-insensitive matching via lookup map
const TOOL_MAP = { edit: 'Edit', write: 'Write', multiedit: 'MultiEdit', bash: 'Bash' };
const toolName = TOOL_MAP[rawToolName.toLowerCase()] || rawToolName;
const inSubagent = isSubagentInvocation(data);
if (toolName === 'Edit' || toolName === 'Write') {
const filePath = toolInput.file_path || '';
if (!filePath || isClaudeSettingsPath(filePath)) {
return rawInput; // allow
}
if (inSubagent) {
return rawInput; // parent session already passed the first-touch file gate
}
if (!isChecked(filePath)) {
if (!markChecked(filePath)) {
return allowWithStateWarning();
}
return denyResult(toolName === 'Edit' ? editGateMsg(filePath) : writeGateMsg(filePath));
}
return rawInput; // allow
}
if (toolName === 'MultiEdit') {
if (inSubagent) {
return rawInput; // parent session already passed the first-touch file gate
}
const edits = toolInput.edits || [];
for (const edit of edits) {
const filePath = edit.file_path || '';
if (filePath && !isClaudeSettingsPath(filePath) && !isChecked(filePath)) {
if (!markChecked(filePath)) {
return allowWithStateWarning();
}
return denyResult(editGateMsg(filePath));
}
}
return rawInput; // allow
}
if (toolName === 'Bash') {
const command = toolInput.command || '';
if (isReadOnlyGitIntrospection(command)) {
return rawInput;
}
if (isDestructiveBash(command)) {
// Gate destructive commands on first attempt; allow retry after facts presented
const key = '__destructive__' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(command).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);
if (!isChecked(key)) {
if (!markChecked(key)) {
return allowWithStateWarning();
}
return denyResult(destructiveBashMsg(), { includeRecoveryHint: false });
}
return rawInput; // allow retry after facts presented
}
if (!isChecked(ROUTINE_BASH_SESSION_KEY)) {
if (!markChecked(ROUTINE_BASH_SESSION_KEY)) {
return allowWithStateWarning();
}
return denyResult(routineBashMsg(), { hookIds: [BASH_HOOK_ID] });
}
return rawInput; // allow
}
return rawInput; // allow
}
module.exports = { run };