Files
everything-claude-code/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
Jamkris 7f971b7e6f fix(ci): treat 'permissions: write-all' as a write-permission gate
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` in `validate-workflow-security.js`
enumerates named GitHub Actions scopes (`contents: write`,
`issues: write`, etc.) to decide whether a workflow needs to:
  - disable `persist-credentials` on `actions/checkout`
  - pass `--ignore-scripts` to `npm ci`

The pattern misses the top-level shorthand `permissions:
write-all`, which is the strictly broader form — it grants every
named scope write access in a single line. As a result, a
workflow that opts into write-all currently slips both gates.

Reproduced on `main` before this commit:

  $ cat /tmp/bad.yml
  name: bad
  on: [push]
  permissions: write-all
  jobs:
    do:
      runs-on: ubuntu-latest
      steps:
        - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        - run: npm ci

  $ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
  Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
  $ echo $?
  0

Expected: at least two violations (missing `persist-credentials:
false`, missing `--ignore-scripts`).
Actual: passes silently.

Fix: add a sibling pattern `WRITE_ALL_PATTERN` that matches
`^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b` and OR it with
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` at the single gate. Both top-level
and job-level `permissions:` blocks satisfy the `^\s*` prefix.

After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:

  ERROR: bad.yml:8 - workflows with write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence
  ERROR: bad.yml:9 - workflows with write permissions must install npm dependencies with --ignore-scripts

Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
  - rejects write-all + credential-persisting checkout
  - rejects write-all + `npm ci` without `--ignore-scripts`
  - allows write-all when both gates are satisfied (no over-block)

Test count: 14 → 17 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.

A separate `refs/pull/N/merge` bypass under `pull_request_target`
exists in the same validator and is fixed in the next commit.
2026-05-17 21:19:29 -04:00

236 lines
7.5 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* Reject unsafe GitHub Actions patterns that execute or checkout untrusted PR code
* from privileged events such as workflow_run or pull_request_target.
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR = path.join(__dirname, '../../.github/workflows');
const RULES = [
{
event: 'workflow_run',
eventPattern: /\bworkflow_run\s*:/m,
description: 'workflow_run must not checkout an untrusted workflow_run head ref/repository',
expressionPattern: /\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.workflow_run\.(?:head_branch|head_sha|head_repository(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+)?)\s*\}\}|\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.workflow_run\.pull_requests\[\d+\]\.head\.(?:ref|sha|repo\.full_name)\s*\}\}/g,
},
{
event: 'pull_request_target',
eventPattern: /\bpull_request_target\s*:/m,
description: 'pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository',
expressionPattern: /\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.pull_request\.head\.(?:ref|sha|repo\.full_name)\s*\}\}/g,
},
];
const WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN = /^\s*(?:contents|issues|pull-requests|actions|checks|deployments|discussions|id-token|packages|pages|repository-projects|security-events|statuses):\s*write\b/m;
// `permissions: write-all` is GitHub Actions' shorthand for granting every
// scope write access. The named-scope pattern above misses it because there
// is no scope name on the left of the colon — just the literal `write-all`
// value at the permissions key. Treat both as equivalent for the purposes
// of the persist-credentials and lifecycle-script gates below.
const WRITE_ALL_PATTERN = /^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b/m;
const NPM_AUDIT_PATTERN = /\bnpm\s+audit\b(?!\s+signatures\b)/;
const NPM_AUDIT_SIGNATURES_PATTERN = /\bnpm\s+audit\s+signatures\b/;
const ACTIONS_CACHE_PATTERN = /uses:\s*['"]?actions\/cache@/m;
const ID_TOKEN_WRITE_PATTERN = /^\s*id-token:\s*write\b/m;
const UNSAFE_INSTALL_PATTERNS = [
{
pattern: /\bnpm\s+ci\b(?![^\n]*--ignore-scripts)/g,
description: 'npm ci must include --ignore-scripts',
},
{
pattern: /\bpnpm\s+install\b(?![^\n]*--ignore-scripts)/g,
description: 'pnpm install must include --ignore-scripts',
},
{
pattern: /\byarn\s+install\b(?![^\n]*--mode=skip-build)/g,
description: 'yarn install must use --mode=skip-build',
},
{
pattern: /\bbun\s+install\b(?![^\n]*--ignore-scripts)/g,
description: 'bun install must include --ignore-scripts',
},
];
function getWorkflowFiles(workflowsDir) {
if (!fs.existsSync(workflowsDir)) {
return [];
}
return fs.readdirSync(workflowsDir)
.filter(file => /\.(?:yml|yaml)$/i.test(file))
.map(file => path.join(workflowsDir, file))
.sort();
}
function getLineNumber(source, index) {
return source.slice(0, index).split(/\r?\n/).length;
}
function extractCheckoutSteps(source) {
const blocks = [];
const lines = source.split(/\r?\n/);
let current = null;
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
const line = lines[i];
const stepStart = line.match(/^(\s*)-\s+/);
if (stepStart) {
if (current) {
blocks.push(current);
}
current = {
indent: stepStart[1].length,
startLine: i + 1,
lines: [line],
};
continue;
}
if (current) {
current.lines.push(line);
}
}
if (current) {
blocks.push(current);
}
return blocks
.map(block => ({
startLine: block.startLine,
text: block.lines.join('\n'),
}))
.filter(block => /uses:\s*['"]?actions\/checkout@/m.test(block.text));
}
function findViolations(filePath, source) {
const violations = [];
const checkoutSteps = extractCheckoutSteps(source);
for (const rule of RULES) {
if (!rule.eventPattern.test(source)) {
continue;
}
for (const step of checkoutSteps) {
for (const match of step.text.matchAll(rule.expressionPattern)) {
violations.push({
filePath,
event: rule.event,
description: rule.description,
expression: match[0],
line: step.startLine + getLineNumber(step.text, match.index) - 1,
});
}
}
}
if (WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN.test(source) || WRITE_ALL_PATTERN.test(source)) {
for (const step of checkoutSteps) {
if (!/persist-credentials:\s*['"]?false['"]?\b/m.test(step.text)) {
violations.push({
filePath,
event: 'write-permission checkout',
description: 'workflows with write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence',
expression: 'actions/checkout without persist-credentials: false',
line: step.startLine,
});
}
}
}
for (const installRule of UNSAFE_INSTALL_PATTERNS) {
for (const match of source.matchAll(installRule.pattern)) {
violations.push({
filePath,
event: 'dependency install scripts',
description: `workflow dependency installs must not run lifecycle scripts: ${installRule.description}`,
expression: match[0],
line: getLineNumber(source, match.index),
});
}
}
if (ID_TOKEN_WRITE_PATTERN.test(source) && ACTIONS_CACHE_PATTERN.test(source)) {
violations.push({
filePath,
event: 'id-token cache',
description: 'workflows with id-token: write must not restore or save shared dependency caches',
expression: 'id-token: write + actions/cache',
line: getLineNumber(source, source.search(ID_TOKEN_WRITE_PATTERN)),
});
}
if (ACTIONS_CACHE_PATTERN.test(source)) {
violations.push({
filePath,
event: 'dependency cache',
description: 'GitHub Actions dependency caches are disabled during active supply-chain hardening',
expression: 'actions/cache',
line: getLineNumber(source, source.search(ACTIONS_CACHE_PATTERN)),
});
}
if (/\bpull_request_target\s*:/m.test(source) && ACTIONS_CACHE_PATTERN.test(source)) {
violations.push({
filePath,
event: 'pull_request_target cache',
description: 'pull_request_target workflows must not restore or save shared dependency caches',
expression: 'pull_request_target + actions/cache',
line: getLineNumber(source, source.search(/\bpull_request_target\s*:/m)),
});
}
if (NPM_AUDIT_PATTERN.test(source) && !NPM_AUDIT_SIGNATURES_PATTERN.test(source)) {
violations.push({
filePath,
event: 'npm audit signatures',
description: 'workflows that run npm audit must also verify registry signatures',
expression: 'npm audit without npm audit signatures',
line: getLineNumber(source, source.search(NPM_AUDIT_PATTERN)),
});
}
return violations;
}
function validateWorkflowSecurity(workflowsDir = DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR) {
const files = getWorkflowFiles(workflowsDir);
const violations = [];
for (const filePath of files) {
const source = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
violations.push(...findViolations(filePath, source));
}
if (violations.length > 0) {
for (const violation of violations) {
console.error(
`ERROR: ${path.basename(violation.filePath)}:${violation.line} - ${violation.description}`,
);
console.error(` Unsafe expression: ${violation.expression}`);
}
return 1;
}
console.log(`Validated workflow security for ${files.length} workflow files`);
return 0;
}
if (require.main === module) {
process.exit(validateWorkflowSecurity(process.env.ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR || DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR));
}
module.exports = {
DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR,
extractCheckoutSteps,
findViolations,
validateWorkflowSecurity,
};