mirror of
https://github.com/affaan-m/everything-claude-code.git
synced 2026-05-19 07:13:07 +08:00
7bb3172041
Three test changes in response to the round-1 review:
1. **Add quoted-write-all coverage** (cubic P0 follow-up).
Two new cases assert the regex now matches the double-quoted and
single-quoted YAML forms of `permissions: "write-all"`:
- `rejects double-quoted permissions: "write-all"`
- `rejects single-quoted permissions: 'write-all'`
Both fixtures trigger only the persist-credentials gate, so they
exercise the WRITE_ALL_PATTERN OR-clause in isolation.
2. **Add expression+ref dedup coverage** (greptile P2 follow-up).
`emits a single violation when both expressionPattern and refPattern
match the same step` — uses `refs/pull/${{ … head.sha }}/merge` as
the fixture (which matches both patterns) and counts ERROR lines for
the `pull_request_target` rule, asserting exactly one. Re-introducing
the duplicate-push bug would re-fail this test immediately.
3. **Drop the `npm ci without --ignore-scripts under write-all` test**
(greptile P2). That test happened to pass under the previous
`--ignore-scripts` regex, but `UNSAFE_INSTALL_PATTERNS` (added in
`f7035b56`) fires unconditionally for every workflow regardless of
permissions. So the test was exercising a pre-existing code path
that has nothing to do with WRITE_ALL_PATTERN. Reviewer flagged this
could mislead future contributors into thinking lifecycle-script
enforcement is gated on write permissions.
Replaced by the surrounding `rejects checkout credential persistence
in workflows with permissions: write-all` test (already present) and
the new quoted-form tests above, which all exercise the actual
persist-credentials gate that the WRITE_ALL_PATTERN clause newly
activates.
Test count: 22 → 24 (added 3 new, dropped 1). All green; `yarn lint`
clean.
The cohort comment above the write-all block was also tightened to
explicitly note that "the lifecycle-script gate already fires
unconditionally for every workflow" so the next reader sees the
distinction up front.
275 lines
17 KiB
JavaScript
275 lines
17 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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/**
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* Validate workflow security guardrails for privileged GitHub Actions events.
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*/
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const assert = require('assert');
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const fs = require('fs');
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const os = require('os');
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const path = require('path');
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const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
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const SCRIPT_PATH = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'ci', 'validate-workflow-security.js');
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function test(name, fn) {
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try {
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fn();
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console.log(` ✓ ${name}`);
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return true;
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} catch (error) {
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console.log(` ✗ ${name}`);
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console.log(` Error: ${error.message}`);
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return false;
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}
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}
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function runValidator(files) {
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const tempDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'ecc-workflow-security-'));
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try {
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for (const [name, contents] of Object.entries(files)) {
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fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tempDir, name), contents);
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}
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return spawnSync('node', [SCRIPT_PATH], {
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encoding: 'utf8',
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env: {
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...process.env,
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ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR: tempDir,
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},
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});
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} finally {
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fs.rmSync(tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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}
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function run() {
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console.log('\n=== Testing workflow security validation ===\n');
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let passed = 0;
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let failed = 0;
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if (test('allows safe workflow_run workflow that only checks out the base repository', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'safe.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n workflow_run:\n workflows: ["CI"]\n types: [completed]\njobs:\n repair:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n - run: echo safe\n`,
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});
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assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects workflow_run checkout using github.event.workflow_run.head_branch', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-workflow-run.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_run:\n workflows: ["CI"]\n types: [completed]\njobs:\n repair:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n ref: \${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /workflow_run must not checkout an untrusted workflow_run head ref\/repository/);
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assert.match(result.stderr, /head_branch/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects workflow_run checkout using github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-repository.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_run:\n workflows: ["CI"]\n types: [completed]\njobs:\n repair:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n repository: \${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name }}\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /head_repository\.full_name/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout using github.event.pull_request.head.sha', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-pr-target.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n branches: [main]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n ref: \${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref\/repository/);
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assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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// Quoted action names are valid YAML. The checkout-step filter must still
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// inspect their `with.ref` values in privileged workflows.
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if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout when uses is double-quoted', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-double-quoted.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n branches: [main]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: "actions/checkout@v4"\n with:\n ref: \${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on double-quoted uses:');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout when uses is single-quoted', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-single-quoted.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n branches: [main]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: 'actions/checkout@v4'\n with:\n ref: \${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on single-quoted uses:');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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// `refs/pull/<N>/{head,merge}` under `pull_request_target` is the canonical
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// privilege-escalation pattern that the standard `github.event.pull_request.head.*`
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// expression check did not cover. Either form pulls attacker-controlled code
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// into a privileged workflow.
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if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout fetching refs/pull/N/merge', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-pr-target-merge-ref.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n types: [opened]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n ref: refs/pull/\${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge\n persist-credentials: false\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on refs/pull/N/merge under pull_request_target');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout fetching hardcoded refs/pull/N/head', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-pr-target-head-ref.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n ref: refs/pull/123/head\n persist-credentials: false\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on hardcoded refs/pull/N/head');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('allows pull_request_target checkout of the base ref (no with.ref)', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'safe-pr-target-base.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n pull_request_target:\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n persist-credentials: false\n - run: echo inspecting base\n`,
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});
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assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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// When a checkout step matches both the expression-based rule
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// (`github.event.pull_request.head.sha`) and the refPattern fallback
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// (`refs/pull/...`), only one violation should be emitted — the
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// expression match is the more specific signal and printing both would
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// duplicate an otherwise identical ERROR line.
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if (test('emits a single violation when both expressionPattern and refPattern match the same step', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-pr-target-both.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n ref: refs/pull/\${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}/merge\n persist-credentials: false\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
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// Count ERROR: lines for this rule's description. Should be exactly 1.
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const matches = (result.stderr || '').match(/ERROR:.*pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/g) || [];
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assert.strictEqual(matches.length, 1, `Expected exactly 1 violation, got ${matches.length}: ${result.stderr}`);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects shared cache use in pull_request_target workflows', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-pr-target-cache.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n branches: [main]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/cache@v5\n with:\n path: ~/.npm\n key: cache\n - run: echo inspect\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on pull_request_target cache use');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request_target workflows must not restore or save shared dependency caches/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects dependency cache use in ordinary workflows', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-cache.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request:\njobs:\n test:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/cache@v5\n with:\n path: ~/.npm\n key: cache\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on actions/cache use');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /dependency caches are disabled during active supply-chain hardening/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects npm ci without ignore-scripts in any workflow', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-install.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request:\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: npm ci\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on npm ci without --ignore-scripts');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /npm ci must include --ignore-scripts/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('allows package-manager installs with lifecycle scripts disabled', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'safe-install.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n pull_request:\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: |\n npm ci --ignore-scripts\n pnpm install --ignore-scripts --no-frozen-lockfile\n yarn install --mode=skip-build\n bun install --ignore-scripts\n`,
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});
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assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects pnpm, yarn, and bun installs that run lifecycle scripts', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-matrix-install.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request:\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: |\n pnpm install --no-frozen-lockfile\n yarn install\n bun install\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on script-running installs');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /pnpm install must include --ignore-scripts/);
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assert.match(result.stderr, /yarn install must use --mode=skip-build/);
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assert.match(result.stderr, /bun install must include --ignore-scripts/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects checkout credential persistence in workflows with write permissions', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-write-checkout.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions:\n contents: write\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on credential-persisting checkout');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('allows checkout with disabled credential persistence in workflows with write permissions', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'safe-write-checkout.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions:\n contents: write\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n persist-credentials: false\n - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n`,
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});
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assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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// `permissions: write-all` is GitHub Actions' shorthand for granting every
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// scope write access. The named-scope pattern only catches `contents: write`,
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// `issues: write`, etc., so workflows that opt into write-all were silently
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// exempted from the persist-credentials gate (the lifecycle-script gate
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// already fires unconditionally for every workflow). The tests below
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// exercise the persist-credentials path specifically — that's the gate the
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// WRITE_ALL_PATTERN OR-clause newly activates.
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if (test('rejects checkout credential persistence in workflows with permissions: write-all', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-write-all-checkout.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions: write-all\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on write-all + credential-persisting checkout');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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// Quoted YAML forms (`"write-all"` and `'write-all'`) are valid YAML for the
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// same scalar value. Verify the WRITE_ALL_PATTERN regex covers them — without
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// the quote markers it silently slips the same persist-credentials gate.
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if (test('rejects double-quoted permissions: "write-all"', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-write-all-double.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions: "write-all"\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on quoted write-all + credential-persisting checkout');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects single-quoted permissions: \'write-all\'', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-write-all-single.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions: 'write-all'\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on single-quoted write-all + credential-persisting checkout');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('allows compliant workflow with permissions: write-all (persist-credentials: false)', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'safe-write-all.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions: write-all\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n persist-credentials: false\n - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n`,
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});
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assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects actions/cache in workflows with id-token write', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-oidc-cache.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n push:\npermissions:\n contents: read\n id-token: write\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/cache@v5\n with:\n path: ~/.npm\n key: cache\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on id-token workflow cache use');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /id-token: write must not restore or save shared dependency caches/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('rejects npm audit without registry signature verification', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'unsafe-audit.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n push:\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: npm audit --audit-level=high\n`,
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});
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assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail when npm audit signatures is missing');
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assert.match(result.stderr, /npm audit must also verify registry signatures/);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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if (test('allows npm audit when registry signatures are verified', () => {
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const result = runValidator({
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'safe-audit.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n push:\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: |\n npm audit signatures\n npm audit --audit-level=high\n`,
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});
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assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
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})) passed++; else failed++;
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console.log(`\nPassed: ${passed}`);
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console.log(`Failed: ${failed}`);
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process.exit(failed > 0 ? 1 : 0);
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}
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run();
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