Merge pull request #1391 from affaan-m/fix/workflow-run-fork-security

fix: block unsafe privileged workflow checkouts

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -190,6 +190,10 @@ jobs:
         run: node scripts/ci/validate-install-manifests.js
         continue-on-error: false
 
+      - name: Validate workflow security
+        run: node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
+        continue-on-error: false
+
       - name: Validate rules
         run: node scripts/ci/validate-rules.js
         continue-on-error: false

.github/workflows/reusable-validate.yml

@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ jobs:
       - name: Validate install manifests
         run: node scripts/ci/validate-install-manifests.js
 
+      - name: Validate workflow security
+        run: node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
+
       - name: Validate rules
         run: node scripts/ci/validate-rules.js
 

scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * Reject unsafe GitHub Actions patterns that execute or checkout untrusted PR code
+ * from privileged events such as workflow_run or pull_request_target.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR = path.join(__dirname, '../../.github/workflows');
+
+const RULES = [
+  {
+    event: 'workflow_run',
+    eventPattern: /\bworkflow_run\s*:/m,
+    description: 'workflow_run must not checkout an untrusted workflow_run head ref/repository',
+    expressionPattern: /\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.workflow_run\.(?:head_branch|head_sha|head_repository(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+)?)\s*\}\}|\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.workflow_run\.pull_requests\[\d+\]\.head\.(?:ref|sha|repo\.full_name)\s*\}\}/g,
+  },
+  {
+    event: 'pull_request_target',
+    eventPattern: /\bpull_request_target\s*:/m,
+    description: 'pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository',
+    expressionPattern: /\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.pull_request\.head\.(?:ref|sha|repo\.full_name)\s*\}\}/g,
+  },
+];
+
+function getWorkflowFiles(workflowsDir) {
+  if (!fs.existsSync(workflowsDir)) {
+    return [];
+  }
+
+  return fs.readdirSync(workflowsDir)
+    .filter(file => /\.(?:yml|yaml)$/i.test(file))
+    .map(file => path.join(workflowsDir, file))
+    .sort();
+}
+
+function getLineNumber(source, index) {
+  return source.slice(0, index).split(/\r?\n/).length;
+}
+
+function extractCheckoutSteps(source) {
+  const blocks = [];
+  const lines = source.split(/\r?\n/);
+  let current = null;
+
+  for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+    const line = lines[i];
+    const stepStart = line.match(/^(\s*)-\s+/);
+
+    if (stepStart) {
+      if (current) {
+        blocks.push(current);
+      }
+
+      current = {
+        indent: stepStart[1].length,
+        startLine: i + 1,
+        lines: [line],
+      };
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (current) {
+      current.lines.push(line);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (current) {
+    blocks.push(current);
+  }
+
+  return blocks
+    .map(block => ({
+      startLine: block.startLine,
+      text: block.lines.join('\n'),
+    }))
+    .filter(block => /uses:\s*actions\/checkout@/m.test(block.text));
+}
+
+function findViolations(filePath, source) {
+  const violations = [];
+  const checkoutSteps = extractCheckoutSteps(source);
+
+  for (const rule of RULES) {
+    if (!rule.eventPattern.test(source)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    for (const step of checkoutSteps) {
+      for (const match of step.text.matchAll(rule.expressionPattern)) {
+        violations.push({
+          filePath,
+          event: rule.event,
+          description: rule.description,
+          expression: match[0],
+          line: step.startLine + getLineNumber(step.text, match.index) - 1,
+        });
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return violations;
+}
+
+function validateWorkflowSecurity(workflowsDir = DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR) {
+  const files = getWorkflowFiles(workflowsDir);
+  const violations = [];
+
+  for (const filePath of files) {
+    const source = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
+    violations.push(...findViolations(filePath, source));
+  }
+
+  if (violations.length > 0) {
+    for (const violation of violations) {
+      console.error(
+        `ERROR: ${path.basename(violation.filePath)}:${violation.line} - ${violation.description}`,
+      );
+      console.error(`  Unsafe expression: ${violation.expression}`);
+    }
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  console.log(`Validated workflow security for ${files.length} workflow files`);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+if (require.main === module) {
+  process.exit(validateWorkflowSecurity(process.env.ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR || DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR));
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR,
+  extractCheckoutSteps,
+  findViolations,
+  validateWorkflowSecurity,
+};

tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * Validate workflow security guardrails for privileged GitHub Actions events.
+ */
+
+const assert = require('assert');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
+
+const SCRIPT_PATH = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'ci', 'validate-workflow-security.js');
+
+function test(name, fn) {
+  try {
+    fn();
+    console.log(`  ✓ ${name}`);
+    return true;
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.log(`  ✗ ${name}`);
+    console.log(`    Error: ${error.message}`);
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+function runValidator(files) {
+  const tempDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'ecc-workflow-security-'));
+  try {
+    for (const [name, contents] of Object.entries(files)) {
+      fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tempDir, name), contents);
+    }
+
+    return spawnSync('node', [SCRIPT_PATH], {
+      encoding: 'utf8',
+      env: {
+        ...process.env,
+        ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR: tempDir,
+      },
+    });
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+}
+
+function run() {
+  console.log('\n=== Testing workflow security validation ===\n');
+
+  let passed = 0;
+  let failed = 0;
+
+  if (test('allows safe workflow_run workflow that only checks out the base repository', () => {
+    const result = runValidator({
+      'safe.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n  workflow_run:\n    workflows: ["CI"]\n    types: [completed]\njobs:\n  repair:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n      - run: echo safe\n`,
+    });
+    assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
+  })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+  if (test('rejects workflow_run checkout using github.event.workflow_run.head_branch', () => {
+    const result = runValidator({
+      'unsafe-workflow-run.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n  workflow_run:\n    workflows: ["CI"]\n    types: [completed]\njobs:\n  repair:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n        with:\n          ref: \${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}\n`,
+    });
+    assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
+    assert.match(result.stderr, /workflow_run must not checkout an untrusted workflow_run head ref\/repository/);
+    assert.match(result.stderr, /head_branch/);
+  })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+  if (test('rejects workflow_run checkout using github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name', () => {
+    const result = runValidator({
+      'unsafe-repository.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n  workflow_run:\n    workflows: ["CI"]\n    types: [completed]\njobs:\n  repair:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n        with:\n          repository: \${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name }}\n`,
+    });
+    assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
+    assert.match(result.stderr, /head_repository\.full_name/);
+  })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+  if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout using github.event.pull_request.head.sha', () => {
+    const result = runValidator({
+      'unsafe-pr-target.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n  pull_request_target:\n    branches: [main]\njobs:\n  inspect:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n        with:\n          ref: \${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n`,
+    });
+    assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
+    assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref\/repository/);
+    assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
+  })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+  console.log(`\nPassed: ${passed}`);
+  console.log(`Failed: ${failed}`);
+
+  process.exit(failed > 0 ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+run();