Files
everything-claude-code/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
Jamkris 7f971b7e6f fix(ci): treat 'permissions: write-all' as a write-permission gate
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` in `validate-workflow-security.js`
enumerates named GitHub Actions scopes (`contents: write`,
`issues: write`, etc.) to decide whether a workflow needs to:
  - disable `persist-credentials` on `actions/checkout`
  - pass `--ignore-scripts` to `npm ci`

The pattern misses the top-level shorthand `permissions:
write-all`, which is the strictly broader form — it grants every
named scope write access in a single line. As a result, a
workflow that opts into write-all currently slips both gates.

Reproduced on `main` before this commit:

  $ cat /tmp/bad.yml
  name: bad
  on: [push]
  permissions: write-all
  jobs:
    do:
      runs-on: ubuntu-latest
      steps:
        - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        - run: npm ci

  $ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
  Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
  $ echo $?
  0

Expected: at least two violations (missing `persist-credentials:
false`, missing `--ignore-scripts`).
Actual: passes silently.

Fix: add a sibling pattern `WRITE_ALL_PATTERN` that matches
`^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b` and OR it with
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` at the single gate. Both top-level
and job-level `permissions:` blocks satisfy the `^\s*` prefix.

After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:

  ERROR: bad.yml:8 - workflows with write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence
  ERROR: bad.yml:9 - workflows with write permissions must install npm dependencies with --ignore-scripts

Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
  - rejects write-all + credential-persisting checkout
  - rejects write-all + `npm ci` without `--ignore-scripts`
  - allows write-all when both gates are satisfied (no over-block)

Test count: 14 → 17 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.

A separate `refs/pull/N/merge` bypass under `pull_request_target`
exists in the same validator and is fixed in the next commit.
2026-05-17 21:19:29 -04:00

216 lines
13 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* Validate workflow security guardrails for privileged GitHub Actions events.
*/
const assert = require('assert');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
const SCRIPT_PATH = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'ci', 'validate-workflow-security.js');
function test(name, fn) {
try {
fn();
console.log(`${name}`);
return true;
} catch (error) {
console.log(`${name}`);
console.log(` Error: ${error.message}`);
return false;
}
}
function runValidator(files) {
const tempDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'ecc-workflow-security-'));
try {
for (const [name, contents] of Object.entries(files)) {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tempDir, name), contents);
}
return spawnSync('node', [SCRIPT_PATH], {
encoding: 'utf8',
env: {
...process.env,
ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR: tempDir,
},
});
} finally {
fs.rmSync(tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}
function run() {
console.log('\n=== Testing workflow security validation ===\n');
let passed = 0;
let failed = 0;
if (test('allows safe workflow_run workflow that only checks out the base repository', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'safe.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n workflow_run:\n workflows: ["CI"]\n types: [completed]\njobs:\n repair:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n - run: echo safe\n`,
});
assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects workflow_run checkout using github.event.workflow_run.head_branch', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-workflow-run.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_run:\n workflows: ["CI"]\n types: [completed]\njobs:\n repair:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n ref: \${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
assert.match(result.stderr, /workflow_run must not checkout an untrusted workflow_run head ref\/repository/);
assert.match(result.stderr, /head_branch/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects workflow_run checkout using github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-repository.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_run:\n workflows: ["CI"]\n types: [completed]\njobs:\n repair:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n repository: \${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name }}\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
assert.match(result.stderr, /head_repository\.full_name/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout using github.event.pull_request.head.sha', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-pr-target.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n branches: [main]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n ref: \${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref\/repository/);
assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
// Quoted action names are valid YAML. The checkout-step filter must still
// inspect their `with.ref` values in privileged workflows.
if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout when uses is double-quoted', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-double-quoted.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n branches: [main]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: "actions/checkout@v4"\n with:\n ref: \${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on double-quoted uses:');
assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout when uses is single-quoted', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-single-quoted.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n branches: [main]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: 'actions/checkout@v4'\n with:\n ref: \${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on single-quoted uses:');
assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects shared cache use in pull_request_target workflows', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-pr-target-cache.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n branches: [main]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/cache@v5\n with:\n path: ~/.npm\n key: cache\n - run: echo inspect\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on pull_request_target cache use');
assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request_target workflows must not restore or save shared dependency caches/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects dependency cache use in ordinary workflows', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-cache.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request:\njobs:\n test:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/cache@v5\n with:\n path: ~/.npm\n key: cache\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on actions/cache use');
assert.match(result.stderr, /dependency caches are disabled during active supply-chain hardening/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects npm ci without ignore-scripts in any workflow', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-install.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request:\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: npm ci\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on npm ci without --ignore-scripts');
assert.match(result.stderr, /npm ci must include --ignore-scripts/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('allows package-manager installs with lifecycle scripts disabled', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'safe-install.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n pull_request:\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: |\n npm ci --ignore-scripts\n pnpm install --ignore-scripts --no-frozen-lockfile\n yarn install --mode=skip-build\n bun install --ignore-scripts\n`,
});
assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects pnpm, yarn, and bun installs that run lifecycle scripts', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-matrix-install.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request:\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: |\n pnpm install --no-frozen-lockfile\n yarn install\n bun install\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on script-running installs');
assert.match(result.stderr, /pnpm install must include --ignore-scripts/);
assert.match(result.stderr, /yarn install must use --mode=skip-build/);
assert.match(result.stderr, /bun install must include --ignore-scripts/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects checkout credential persistence in workflows with write permissions', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-write-checkout.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions:\n contents: write\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on credential-persisting checkout');
assert.match(result.stderr, /write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('allows checkout with disabled credential persistence in workflows with write permissions', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'safe-write-checkout.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions:\n contents: write\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n persist-credentials: false\n - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n`,
});
assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
})) passed++; else failed++;
// `permissions: write-all` is GitHub Actions' shorthand for granting every
// scope write access. The named-scope pattern only catches `contents: write`,
// `issues: write`, etc., so workflows that opt into write-all were silently
// exempted from the persist-credentials and --ignore-scripts gates.
if (test('rejects checkout credential persistence in workflows with permissions: write-all', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-write-all-checkout.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions: write-all\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on write-all + credential-persisting checkout');
assert.match(result.stderr, /write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects npm ci without ignore-scripts in workflows with permissions: write-all', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-write-all-install.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions: write-all\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n persist-credentials: false\n - run: npm ci\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on write-all + npm ci without --ignore-scripts');
assert.match(result.stderr, /npm ci must include --ignore-scripts/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('allows compliant workflow with permissions: write-all', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'safe-write-all.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions: write-all\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n persist-credentials: false\n - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n`,
});
assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects actions/cache in workflows with id-token write', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-oidc-cache.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n push:\npermissions:\n contents: read\n id-token: write\njobs:\n release:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/cache@v5\n with:\n path: ~/.npm\n key: cache\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on id-token workflow cache use');
assert.match(result.stderr, /id-token: write must not restore or save shared dependency caches/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('rejects npm audit without registry signature verification', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-audit.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n push:\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: npm audit --audit-level=high\n`,
});
assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail when npm audit signatures is missing');
assert.match(result.stderr, /npm audit must also verify registry signatures/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
if (test('allows npm audit when registry signatures are verified', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'safe-audit.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n push:\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: |\n npm audit signatures\n npm audit --audit-level=high\n`,
});
assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
})) passed++; else failed++;
console.log(`\nPassed: ${passed}`);
console.log(`Failed: ${failed}`);
process.exit(failed > 0 ? 1 : 0);
}
run();