coderabbitai flagged: the two `catch` blocks in `readSessionCost`
silently swallowed every failure mode. A malformed `costs.jsonl`
row, a permission error opening the file, or any other unexpected
I/O failure would silently return zero cost — masking real
problems and feeding stale or zero numbers into
`ecc-context-monitor.js` (which then injects them as
`additionalContext` into the live model turn).
Fix two things, both fail-open-preserving:
1. **Inner JSON.parse catch** — count malformed lines and write
one aggregated breadcrumb per call:
[ecc-metrics-bridge] skipped N malformed line(s) in <path>
Aggregating (rather than per-line) keeps a log-flooded
`costs.jsonl` diagnosable without overwhelming stderr.
2. **Outer fs.readFileSync catch** — write a breadcrumb on real
errors, but stay silent on `ENOENT`. The "no costs.jsonl yet"
case is genuinely normal (no Stop event has fired this session)
and producing noise on every PreToolUse before the first Stop
would be reviewer-visible spam. All other error codes
(`EACCES`, `EISDIR`, `EMFILE`, …) get:
[ecc-metrics-bridge] failing open after <name> reading <path>: <msg>
In both cases the function still returns the zero-cost fallback
so the bridge never breaks tool execution — only the
diagnosability changes.
Two new regression tests in
`tests/hooks/ecc-metrics-bridge.test.js`:
✓ readSessionCost writes a stderr breadcrumb when malformed
lines are skipped — feeds 4 rows (2 valid, 2 malformed),
asserts the last valid row still wins AND captured stderr
contains "skipped 2 malformed line(s)".
✓ readSessionCost stays silent when costs.jsonl does not exist
(ENOENT) — uses a fresh tmp HOME with no metrics dir, asserts
zero return AND empty stderr.
Test count: 16 → 18; `npm test` green; `yarn lint` clean.
`readSessionCost` read only the trailing 8 KiB of
`~/.claude/metrics/costs.jsonl` to "avoid scanning entire file".
That ceiling is the opposite-sign sibling of the double-count bug
fixed in the previous commit: once a session's most recent
cumulative row gets pushed past the 8 KiB window by newer rows
from other sessions, the bridge silently reports `totalCost: 0`,
`totalIn: 0`, `totalOut: 0` for that session — same false signal
to `ecc-context-monitor.js`, same wrong number injected into the
live model turn as `additionalContext`.
`cost-tracker.js` has no rotation policy, so on any non-trivial
workstation costs.jsonl grows past 8 KiB within minutes of normal
use. For users who keep multiple concurrent sessions, this means
the second-and-later sessions silently report zero almost
immediately.
Reproduced before this commit:
$ HOME=/tmp/eccc node -e '
const fs = require("fs");
const m = require("./scripts/hooks/ecc-metrics-bridge.js");
// S1 row at file start, then 200 rows of OTHER-session noise (~16 KiB).
// S1 is the row we want, but it sits past the 8 KiB tail.
const s1 = `{"session_id":"S1","estimated_cost_usd":0.5,"input_tokens":500,"output_tokens":250}`;
const other = `{"session_id":"OTHER","estimated_cost_usd":1,"input_tokens":100,"output_tokens":50}`;
fs.mkdirSync("/tmp/eccc/.claude/metrics", { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync("/tmp/eccc/.claude/metrics/costs.jsonl",
[s1, ...Array(200).fill(other)].join("\\n") + "\\n");
console.log(JSON.stringify(m.readSessionCost("S1")));'
{"totalCost":0,"totalIn":0,"totalOut":0}
Expected: `{"totalCost":0.5, "totalIn":500, "totalOut":250}` (the
S1 row that exists in the file).
Actual: zero — the row is past the 8 KiB tail.
Fix: drop the `fs.openSync` + bounded `fs.readSync` + position
arithmetic in favour of `fs.readFileSync(costsPath, 'utf8')` and
iterate every line. Each row is ~150 bytes; even 100k rows is
~15 MB and a single sync read on PreToolUse is in the low ms.
If file rotation lands in `cost-tracker.js` later, this scan
becomes proportionally cheaper.
After this commit the reproduction above returns
`{"totalCost":0.5, "totalIn":500, "totalOut":250}`.
Regression test in `tests/hooks/ecc-metrics-bridge.test.js`:
`readSessionCost finds session row beyond the old 8 KiB tail
boundary`. The test asserts the costs.jsonl fixture is > 8 KiB
before reading so any reintroduction of a bounded tail would
re-fail the test (i.e. the assertion is the contract, not the
specific number 8192).
Together with the previous commit, both directions of the
metrics-bridge cost-reporting bug are closed.
`ecc-metrics-bridge.js#readSessionCost` summed the
`estimated_cost_usd`, `input_tokens`, and `output_tokens` of
every matching row in `~/.claude/metrics/costs.jsonl`. That breaks
the documented contract of `scripts/hooks/cost-tracker.js`, which
explicitly states (in its module docblock):
Cumulative behavior: Stop fires per assistant response, not
per session. Each row therefore represents the cumulative
session total up to that point. To get per-session cost, take
the last row per session_id.
Summing N cumulative rows over-counts by roughly (N+1)/2 ×. For a
session with 3 rows at 0.01, 0.02, 0.03 USD (true running total
0.03), the bridge today reports 0.06 USD. The over-counted value
feeds `ecc-context-monitor.js`, which then trips its
COST_NOTICE_USD / COST_WARNING_USD / COST_CRITICAL_USD thresholds
on phantom spend AND injects the inflated number as
`additionalContext` into the live model turn — so the agent
itself is told a wrong cost.
Reproduced on `main` before this commit:
$ cat > /tmp/eccc/.claude/metrics/costs.jsonl <<EOF
{"session_id":"S1","estimated_cost_usd":0.01,"input_tokens":333,"output_tokens":166}
{"session_id":"S1","estimated_cost_usd":0.02,"input_tokens":666,"output_tokens":333}
{"session_id":"S1","estimated_cost_usd":0.03,"input_tokens":1000,"output_tokens":500}
EOF
$ HOME=/tmp/eccc node -e 'const m = require("./scripts/hooks/ecc-metrics-bridge.js"); \
console.log(JSON.stringify(m.readSessionCost("S1")))'
{"totalCost":0.06,"totalIn":1999,"totalOut":999}
Expected: `{"totalCost":0.03,"totalIn":1000,"totalOut":500}` (the
last cumulative row).
Actual: 2× over-count.
Fix: replace `+=` with `=` in the matching branch so the assigned
values reflect the most recent row encountered. The iteration
order is file order, which is also event time order, so the last
assignment wins — exactly the contract cost-tracker writes
against.
After this commit the reproduction above returns
`{"totalCost":0.03,"totalIn":1000,"totalOut":500}`.
Regression test in `tests/hooks/ecc-metrics-bridge.test.js`:
`readSessionCost returns the LAST cumulative row, not the sum
(cost-tracker contract)`. The existing
`readSessionCost does not include unrelated default-session rows`
test happened to pass even with the bug because it only had one
target-session row — single-row sessions are coincidentally
correct under both formulas. The new test uses three rows so the
two formulas diverge.
A second issue in the same function — the 8 KiB tail-only read
silently drops older rows once a session's recent cumulative
totals scroll past that window — is fixed in the next commit.
Three test changes in response to the round-1 review:
1. **Add quoted-write-all coverage** (cubic P0 follow-up).
Two new cases assert the regex now matches the double-quoted and
single-quoted YAML forms of `permissions: "write-all"`:
- `rejects double-quoted permissions: "write-all"`
- `rejects single-quoted permissions: 'write-all'`
Both fixtures trigger only the persist-credentials gate, so they
exercise the WRITE_ALL_PATTERN OR-clause in isolation.
2. **Add expression+ref dedup coverage** (greptile P2 follow-up).
`emits a single violation when both expressionPattern and refPattern
match the same step` — uses `refs/pull/${{ … head.sha }}/merge` as
the fixture (which matches both patterns) and counts ERROR lines for
the `pull_request_target` rule, asserting exactly one. Re-introducing
the duplicate-push bug would re-fail this test immediately.
3. **Drop the `npm ci without --ignore-scripts under write-all` test**
(greptile P2). That test happened to pass under the previous
`--ignore-scripts` regex, but `UNSAFE_INSTALL_PATTERNS` (added in
`f7035b56`) fires unconditionally for every workflow regardless of
permissions. So the test was exercising a pre-existing code path
that has nothing to do with WRITE_ALL_PATTERN. Reviewer flagged this
could mislead future contributors into thinking lifecycle-script
enforcement is gated on write permissions.
Replaced by the surrounding `rejects checkout credential persistence
in workflows with permissions: write-all` test (already present) and
the new quoted-form tests above, which all exercise the actual
persist-credentials gate that the WRITE_ALL_PATTERN clause newly
activates.
Test count: 22 → 24 (added 3 new, dropped 1). All green; `yarn lint`
clean.
The cohort comment above the write-all block was also tightened to
explicitly note that "the lifecycle-script gate already fires
unconditionally for every workflow" so the next reader sees the
distinction up front.
Two round-1 review findings, fixed together because they touch the
same regex/loop region of `findViolations`:
1. **cubic P0 — quoted write-all bypass**.
`WRITE_ALL_PATTERN` was `/^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b/m`, which
does not match the perfectly valid YAML forms
`permissions: "write-all"` and `permissions: 'write-all'`. A
workflow that quoted the shorthand slipped right through the
persist-credentials gate the previous commit was supposed to close.
Reproduced before this commit:
$ cat /tmp/q.yml
name: bad
on: [push]
permissions: "write-all"
jobs:
do:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
exit=0
Fix: tighten the regex to
/^\s*permissions:\s*["']?write-all["']?\s*$/m
which accepts the bare, double-quoted, and single-quoted YAML forms
while still anchoring on the `permissions:` key. The trailing `\s*$`
prevents accidentally matching keys whose value happens to start
with `write-all` (e.g. some future literal `write-all-something`).
2. **greptile P2 — duplicate violation when both patterns match**.
A `ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}/merge`
value matches both the `pull_request_target` rule's
`expressionPattern` (the `head.sha` interpolation) and its
`refPattern` (the `refs/pull/` literal). Each push generates an
ERROR line with the same description and just a different
`expression:` echo, so the reviewer sees the same violation twice.
Fix: track `stepFlagged` inside the per-step loop and skip the
`refPattern` fallback once any `expressionPattern` match has already
produced a violation for this step. The `refPattern` is a fallback
for ref-only forms (`refs/pull/123/head`, `${{ env.X }}` whose
resolved value is a PR ref); when the more specific expression
already fires, the fallback is redundant by definition.
After both fixes, the round-1 reproductions resolve cleanly:
$ # quoted form now blocks
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp/q1/.github/workflows node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
ERROR: quoted.yml:8 - workflows with write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence
exit=1
$ # combined head.sha + refs/pull now prints one ERROR, not two
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp/q2/.github/workflows node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
ERROR: dup.yml:10 - pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository
Unsafe expression: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
exit=1
Test additions land in the next commit.
The `pull_request_target` rule's `expressionPattern` matches only
the canonical `github.event.pull_request.head.{ref,sha,repo.full_name}`
interpolations. It does not match the second canonical form of
the same exploit — fetching `refs/pull/<N>/{head,merge}` directly:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge
The merge-ref variant is what GitHub's own security guidance calls
out as the highest-severity privilege-escalation pattern under
`pull_request_target`: it materialises the PR's merge commit
(attacker code spliced with base), executes inside a workflow that
has full repo-scoped tokens, and gives the attacker the chance to
exfiltrate secrets or push to default branches. `refs/pull/N/head`
is functionally equivalent — same source, same trust boundary.
Reproduced on `main` before this commit:
$ cat /tmp/bad.yml
name: bad
on: { pull_request_target: { types: [opened] } }
permissions: { contents: read }
jobs:
do:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge
persist-credentials: false
- run: npm ci --ignore-scripts
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
$ echo $?
0
Expected: violation flagging the refs/pull checkout under pull_request_target.
Actual: passes silently.
Fix: add a `refPattern` to the `pull_request_target` rule:
/^\s*ref:\s*['"]?[^'"\n]*refs\/(?:remotes\/)?pull\/[^'"\n\s]+/m
and apply it per checkout step inside the existing
event-gated loop. The pattern matches the ref VALUE so it catches
all interpolation shapes — `refs/pull/123/head`,
`refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge`,
`${{ env.FOO }}/refs/pull/N/head` — without enumerating the
possible interpolations themselves.
Scoping: the rule is already gated on the workflow containing
`pull_request_target:`, so non-privileged `pull_request` workflows
that legitimately check out a PR ref are not affected.
After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:
ERROR: bad.yml:10 - pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository
Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
- rejects pull_request_target + refs/pull/<N>/merge
- rejects pull_request_target + hardcoded refs/pull/<N>/head
- allows pull_request_target with no `with.ref:` (base-ref checkout —
the safe pattern from GitHub's own guidance)
Test count: 17 → 20 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.
Together with the previous commit, this closes the two
independent `validate-workflow-security.js` bypasses I found.
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` in `validate-workflow-security.js`
enumerates named GitHub Actions scopes (`contents: write`,
`issues: write`, etc.) to decide whether a workflow needs to:
- disable `persist-credentials` on `actions/checkout`
- pass `--ignore-scripts` to `npm ci`
The pattern misses the top-level shorthand `permissions:
write-all`, which is the strictly broader form — it grants every
named scope write access in a single line. As a result, a
workflow that opts into write-all currently slips both gates.
Reproduced on `main` before this commit:
$ cat /tmp/bad.yml
name: bad
on: [push]
permissions: write-all
jobs:
do:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- run: npm ci
$ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
$ echo $?
0
Expected: at least two violations (missing `persist-credentials:
false`, missing `--ignore-scripts`).
Actual: passes silently.
Fix: add a sibling pattern `WRITE_ALL_PATTERN` that matches
`^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b` and OR it with
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` at the single gate. Both top-level
and job-level `permissions:` blocks satisfy the `^\s*` prefix.
After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:
ERROR: bad.yml:8 - workflows with write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence
ERROR: bad.yml:9 - workflows with write permissions must install npm dependencies with --ignore-scripts
Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
- rejects write-all + credential-persisting checkout
- rejects write-all + `npm ci` without `--ignore-scripts`
- allows write-all when both gates are satisfied (no over-block)
Test count: 14 → 17 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.
A separate `refs/pull/N/merge` bypass under `pull_request_target`
exists in the same validator and is fixed in the next commit.
Adds `--locale <code>` support to the ECC installer so users can install
localized reference docs (agents, commands, skills, rules) into
`~/.claude/docs/<locale>/` alongside the existing English installation.
Changes:
- manifests/install-modules.json: add 8 locale doc modules (docs-ja-JP,
docs-zh-CN, docs-ko-KR, docs-pt-BR, docs-ru, docs-tr, docs-vi-VN,
docs-zh-TW), each with kind="docs" and defaultInstall=false
- manifests/install-components.json: add 8 locale: components mapping to
the new modules
- scripts/lib/install-manifests.js: add locale: family prefix,
SUPPORTED_LOCALES, LOCALE_ALIAS_TO_COMPONENT_ID (with aliases like
ja=ja-JP, zh=zh-CN, ko=ko-KR), and listSupportedLocales()
- scripts/lib/install/request.js: add --locale flag to parseInstallArgs(),
resolve locale alias → component ID in normalizeInstallRequest(), throw
on unsupported locale codes
- scripts/lib/install-targets/claude-home.js: map docs/<locale>/ source
paths to ~/.claude/docs/<locale>/ destination (side-by-side, no overwrite
of English files)
- scripts/install-apply.js: import listSupportedLocales, add --locale
usage line and available locales list to --help output
Usage examples:
./install.sh --locale ja # Japanese docs only
./install.sh --profile core --locale zh-CN # core profile + zh-CN docs
./install.sh typescript --locale ja # legacy + locale (errors)
Adds docs/th/README.md with a concise onboarding-style Thai
translation mirroring the docs/vi-VN format. Updates the language
switchers in the English, Simplified Chinese, Traditional Chinese,
Japanese, Korean, Portuguese (BR), Russian, Turkish, Vietnamese,
and Simplified Chinese docs READMEs to link to the new Thai page.
The English README remains the canonical source of truth; the Thai
page links back to it for full content.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
